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History

Evolution of an Idea: Adaption of the Militia from the Peace
of Paris to the Great War
Director: Associate Professor Michael S. Mayer
At the end of the War of Independence, Americans found
themselves with a need for a military force in the Northwest
Territory. The government under the Articles of
Confederation possessed no authority to create a full-time
army. After the new Constitution replaced the Articles of
Confederation, a solution to the problem of national defense
emerged. That solution, which included a small regular army
which could be augmented by state militia, served with
little modification until the early twentieth century, when
a crisis on a border exposed the drawbacks of the system.
This study examines the process through which the old
Revolutionary idea of a strong state-based militia as the
main instrument of national defense was slowly replaced by a
mostly federally controlled National Guard as a second line
of defense.
The first part of this study is based on the writings of
those most influential in creating the constitutional basis
for the old Regular Army and militia. Later chapters rely on
the writings of those involved in the Preparedness debate of
the early twentieth century. The experience of the Regular
Army and the National Guard in response to Pancho Villa's
raids on the Mexican border are explored as the catalyst for
change just prior to the Great War. The Militia Acts of
1792, 1903, and 1908, several Volunteer Acts, as well as the
National Defense Act of 1916, provide the basic focus.
The military needs of the Northwest Territory in the 1780s
and the Mexican border area in 1916 exposed the weaknesses
of the militia system. Both times, America responded by
strengthening federal control of military force at the
expense of the states. Change came only when real, rather
than hypothetical, challenges could not be met under the
existing structure.
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Introduction

America

has

two

distinct

military

institutions— the

Regular Army and the militia. Both institutions had a history
in England that began long before the establishment of British
colonies on the east coast of North America-

Shortly after

settlement in the New World, the English in Massachusetts Bay
Colony established a colonial militia for their protection.
Interest in the colonial militia rose and fell with the threat
from Indians and French. The institution, however, continued
throughout the colonial period. The colonial militia remained
a locally-based military force for the protection of the town,
or for use by the colonial government. Although the militia
aided the British army in the mid-eighteenth century,

the

militia in both England and America remained distinct from the
army. After independence from Britain, America began a slow
process that eventually wrought a fundamental change in the
relationship between the militia and the army.
The relationship between state militia and the federal
government underwent two periods of transformation between the
end of the War of Independence and the beginning of the Great
War-

The

first

change

came

with

the

adoption

of

the

Constitution in 1789 and the passage of the Militia Act of
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1792, which established a full-time regular army plus a statebased militia for national defense and local security.
system

created

in

those

early

years

served

the

The

Republic

through the nineteenth century.
In the early twentieth century, the Militia Act of 1903
began the process of integrating the National Guard more fully
into the defense structure. However, traditional fears of a
federal

monopoly

integration

of

on

the

military
National

force
Guard

prevented
with

the

a

practical

Regular

Army.

Events on the Mexican border and in northern Mexico following
the Mexican Revolution exposed weaknesses

in the American

defense structure. With a major European war threatening to
involve the United States, military operations on the Mexican
border fully taxed the American military establishment. As a
consequence. Congress passed the National Defense Act of 1916,
partially to integrate further the National Guard and Regular
Army.
United

The Great War
States;

in Europe threatened to entangle

however,

it took

the

actual

experience

the
in

Mexico to bring about concrete changes in the relationship
between the Regular Army and the National Guard.
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I. The Old Northwest and the Constitution

Between

the

Revolutionary War,
1789,

Peace

of

Paris

at

the

end

of

the

and the adoption of the Constitution in

state militia provided the new nation with

its only

substantial military force.' In part, this desire to disband
the

Continental

Army

resulted

from

the

Englishmen's

traditional fear of a standing army, combined with the belief
that the new nation had no need to keep a standing army.
Opposition to the proposed Society of Cincinnati, consisting
of

former

Continental

Army

officers,

reflected

public

antipathy to any organization of regulars after the end of
hostilities.^ With the adoption of the new Constitution in
1789, the federal government received specific permission to
create a federal standing army not dependent on the states for
recruiting or equipping. The eight years between the end of
the

War

of

Independence

and

the

drafting

of

the

new

Constitution combined with experiences from the war to sway

‘Richard H. Kohn, Eaale and Sword: The Federalists and
the Creation of the Militarv Establishment in America (New
York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 45. Kohn estimates that the
states had a total of 400,000 men enrolled in the militia.
^James K. Martin, and Mark E. Lender, A Respectable Armv:
The Militarv Origins of the Republic. 1763-1789 (Arlington
Heights, II: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1982), pp. 202-203.
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the balance in favor of a standing army. By 1787, enough of
the

framers

of the new Constitution believed that

if the

government and nation were to survive internal revolts and to
secure the frontier, then the government needed something more
professional and reliable than militia.
The Articles of Confederation,

from 1 March 1781 until

the Constitution went into effect on 4 March 1789, required
that

each

state

"...always

disciplined militia..

keep

up

a

well-regulated

and

along with the stores needed to supply

i t T h e Articles also provided for a war-time national army.
This was not to be a standing regular army but one dependent
on

the

states.

Article

VII

provided

that

the

state

legislatures would raise the land forces for common defense,
with the state legislatures commissioning all officers below
the rank of general,

and that the home state's legislature

kept the sole authority to fill any vacancies that occurred in
the officer corps during the period its forces were engaged in
the

common

defense.

The

fifth

paragraph

of

Article

IX

explained the method for apportioning the burden of providing
individual soldiers among the states.'*
The

government

under

the

Articles

of

Confederation

clearly received the authority to gather an army from state
regiments, as well as the responsibility to pay it. However,
the national government lacked a reliable method of raising
^Articles of Confederation, Article VI, Paragraph 4.
^Ibid., Article IX, Paragraph 5.
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money to pay for an army, and the states actually received the
responsibility to form and equip the regiments.

After the

states raised, equipped, and trained their quota of regiments,
the federal government would muster the regiments into federal
service.

These

state-raised regiments

together

formed

the

national army; no regular units existed. This system resembled
more the method used in North America during the French and
Indian Wars, where colonial governments organized and equipped
militia, which then served under British generals, than a true
federal army.® With regiments in federal service organized by
their home states,

and with all officers below the rank of

general commissioned by their state governments,

the state

governments would continue to have a strong influence in the
national

army

confederal

thus

concept

created.
of

the

The

difference

national

army

between

and

the

the

system

employed by Britain during the colonial period was that the
colonial

militia

whereas

none

had

existed

Revolutionary War,
Continental Army,

a

regular
under

the militia

British

the

army

to

Articles.®

augmented

the

augment,

During

the

professional

but the Articles did not provide for the

retention or recreation of the Continental Army after the war.

®Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Armv
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), p. 17.
®In the nineteenth century, the United States would
return to a system closely resembling that of the colonial
period. In the Mexican, Civil, and Spanish Wars, as well as
many Indian wars, the locally raised U.S. Volunteers augmented
the small Regular Army for the duration of the conflicts.
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In the concept outlined in the Articles,

a "federal"

existed only when called into service for war,
other emergency. Most likely,

army

revolt,

or

the bulk of men and officers

raised by the states for their quotas would come from the
militia.
The system envisioned by the framers

of the Articles

lacked the ability to sustain a prolonged military presence on
the frontier. With the British army due to evacuate the old
Northwest, the newly independent United States had no national
forces with which to fill the vacuum. George Washington and
other

nationalists

feared

that

the

Indians

would

either

dismantle or burn the forts in the Northwest when the British
evacuated them under the terms of the Treaty of Paris.^
The part time nature of state militia rendered them illsuited for the mission. Militiamen with families and farms or
businesses could not be expected to remain at frontier posts
for more than a few months, and the constant rotation would
burden both the commanders of the forts by constantly changing
their soldiers and the militia system itself. The framers of
the Articles of Confederation drafted their plan of government
during the war with Great Britain. They planned a military
system

to

defend

the

nation

against

a

more

conventional

^John Fitzpatrick, ed. , Writings of Georae Washington
from the original Manuscript sources. 1745-1799 (Washington:
United States Government Printing Office, 1938), P. 26:398400. In a letter of 3 May 1783 to the President of the
Continental Congress, Washington expressed his urgent desire
to occupy the forts as soon as the British evacuated them.
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adversary— similar to Great Britain. However, the early years
of

independence

presented

a

very

different

problem— a

seemingly endless struggle with the Indians on the frontier.
Not all leaders in the days after York town saw a national
army as something to be avoided. Many of the leaders of the
military effort against Great Britain realized that without a
professional force developed in peacetime, the security of the
Republic remained in jeopardy.* But these men also realized
that "they were caught in an uncomfortable dilemma....[T]he
standing army was politically unfeasible...yet some regular
establishment

was

imperative

because

the

militia

was

unquestionably unsound militarily."® Accordingly, men such as
Secretary of War Henry Knox, future Secretary of War Timothy
Pickering, and drill master of the Continental Army Frederick
von

Steuben

submitted

to

Washington,

at

his

request,

suggestions for strengthening the military structure of the
United

States.

Von

Steuben's

proposal,

outlined

in

his

pamphlet A Letter on the Subject of an Established Militia,
and Militarv Arrangements. Addressed to the Inhabitants of the
United States far exceeded the others
others

stressed more uniformity,

in scope.

training,

and

Where the
discipline

within the present militia structure, Steuben suggested the

*Martin and Lender, A Respectable A rmy, p. 74
®Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 44.
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creation of three regionally based "Militia Legions."*® These
new "Legions" bore a more than casual resemblance to one of
Washington's own ideas for reforming the militia— abolish it
in all but name,** Washington called his plan the "Continental
Militia," which proposed a reserve force recruited, trained,
and equipped on the national level,*^ Washington consolidated
the reports of his subordinates and sent them to Alexander
Hamilton, who had requested Washington's advice on the matter,
on 2 May 1783.*^
Hamilton,

New York's delegate to Congress,

chaired at

that time a congressional committee investigating solutions to
the nation's need to protect the western frontier, as well as
to guard against Britain in the north, and Spain in the south.
The proposals eventually submitted to Congress by Hamilton's
committee echoed most of the ideas in Washington's Sentiments
on a Peace Establishment, which the general had submitted to
Congress as his recommendations for a post-war military. As

*®John Whiteclay Chambers II, To Raise an Armv; The Draft
Comes to Modern America (New York; The Free Press, 1987), p,
25,
**Fitzpatrick, ed, , The Writings of Georae Washington.
6:110. Washington's distrust in part-time soldiers shows
throughout his writings. Here he hoped, after commanding
militia in December on 1776, that he would only again command
militia when absolutely necessary. He stressed that only long
and hard training could turn civilians into soldiers who would
not break under fire,
*^Ibid,, George Washington's "Sentiments
Establishment," l May 1783, 26:374-398,
*^Ibid,
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on

a

Peace

9

did Washington,

Hamilton urged the formation of a standing

army, but with the stipulation that the national military be
recruited, paid, and supplied by the confederal government.
Hamilton also proposed that Congress commission all officers
of the national army. Both ideas far exceeded any power given
to

the

central

government

under

the

Articles

of

Confederation.
For the militia,

Hamilton followed the advice of von

Steuben and Washington but added more detail. Believing the
militia concept fundamentally useless, he instead proposed a
reserve corps of volunteers to be enlisted for eight years,
paid and supplied by the national government, and liable for
service wherever the national government ordered.

This new

institution would be city-based, because only the population
density

of

the

militiamen to

cities

allowed

live close

the

required

numbers

of

enough to the training areas

to

ensure regular drill. Numbers would be kept to 2 percent of
those

liable

for

militia

service,

and

the

old

obligation for all adult white males would be

militia

allowed to

lapse, in the belief that attempts to train the old, infirm,
and uninterested only diverted money and talent that could be
better

used

on

an

elite

few.*^

Neither

Hamilton

nor

von

Steuben could see any merit in a militia that included all
‘'‘Harold Syrett, ed. , Papers of Alexander Hamilton (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1962) , "Report on a Military
Peace Establishment" 3:378-379.
‘*Ibid.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10

adult men;

instead,

they placed their hopes on the young,

healthy, and enthusiastic. In a period where many Americans
feared the power of the central government, and especially the
potential for abuse by a standing army, Hamilton's proposals
never had much chance of acceptance,'* Moreover, their plans
for the militia, and even more so, the national army, exceeded
any

authority

Congress

received

from

the

Articles

of

Confederation.
Later, Hamilton returned to the problems of creating a
viable military force in a society hostile to a peacetime
army.

In Numbers

Hamilton

24 through

28

that

nation

argued

professional

army.

In

the

Number

of the

24,

Federalist Papers,

needed
he

a

explained

full-time
that

the

nation needed a military presence on the frontier and that
either temporary detachments of militia or a small standing
army would have to provide this presence.

He then argued

against using militia to garrison the west because of the
added

expense

opposition

by

of
the

constant

rotations

militiamen

and

themselves

the
if

inevitable

subjected

to

repeated long-term service. In the Federalist Paper Number 25,
he stressed that soldiering, like any other profession, needed

'^Richard Kohn, ed., Analo-American Militarv Tracts 16971830 (New York: Arno Press, 1979), p. 173-192. An "ORATION
DELIVERED AT BOSTON, MARCH 5, 1783" by Dr. Thomas Welsh
revealed the distrust both of the standing army, and of the
professional soldier, held by many Bostonians.
'^Isaac Kramnick, ed., The Federalist Papers
Penguin Books, 1987), pp. 188-207.
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at least a core of full-time practitioners if the nation were
to

be

able

to

defend

itself.

Under

the

Articles

of

Confederation, the United states could legally prepare for war
only after another nation either declared war,
invaded the United states.
threats

coming

from

or actually

Hamilton saw potential external

Great

Britain,

Spain,

and

from

the

Indians.**
However, Hamilton argued from a national perspective. The
states

in

nations

the

rather

1780s

still

saw

than part of

themselves

a single

as

country.

independent
Hence,

the

representatives from Rhode Island could ask why their militia,
as well as the militia from other Atlantic states, should have
to protect the frontier of New York and Virginia.*® Westerners
wondered why the burden for protecting the western borders
should fall to the states

on the

frontier,

while

coastal

states enjoyed protection without the cost.
The problem of the western border of the United States
soon

became

confused

by

confederation jurisdiction.
requested,

in April

1783,

the

overlapping

of

state

and

Both New York and Pennsylvania
assistance

in dealing with

the

Indians in their western lands. New York would continue to
press for the authority to raise a state army for the problem,
for

the

Articles

of

Confederation

required

congressional

**Ibid., pp. 190-191.
*®Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 52.
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approval for any state to raise a standing army of its own.^®
Less than a year later,

in March 1784, Virginia officially

ceded its claims to territory in the old Northwest.^* With the
cession, the national government held territory independent of
the states without having the means to protect the surveyors
needed before the land could be sold. Congress also needed to
remove the squatters who had been moving onto the lands, and
to negotiate treaties with the Indians before the national
government

could

begin

to

exploit

its

wealth

in

western

lands.“
Making

the

situation more

critical,

on

2 June

1784,

Congress discharged all but eighty of the remaining 600 men in
the Continental Army.^ The discharged men had been recruited
near the end of the war and had needed additional inducements
to

join.

All

had

been

on

a

higher

pay

scale,

with

the

additional pay coming from their home states of Massachusetts
and New Hampshire. With the New England states blocking all
efforts to create a standing army. Congress had no choice but
to allow the enlistments to lapse. The few remaining active
soldiers kept busy guarding the leftover Revolutionary War
supplies stored at West Point, New York and Fort Pitt, at the
^Articles of Confederation, Article VI, Paragraph 4.
^'Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 55.
^Ibid.
23

^Journals of the Continental Congress. Vol.
XXVI,
(Washington;
General
Services
Administration,
National
Archives and Record Service, 1976), 26:524.
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source of the Ohio.^
Possessing no real army with which to act. Congress faced
the

ever-pressing

problem

of

problems

occupying

temporarily abated

the

of

squatters

forts

and

Indians.

the

Great

along

in September of 1783,

The

Lakes

when von Steuben

reported back from Canada that the British would not evacuate
the forts for another year or two.

The war against Britain

had barely ended and the new American government felt relieved
when the British failed to evacuate the western forts. The
British action temporarily lifted from Congress the burden of
forging a plan to occupy the

forts

in order to keep

the

Indians from taking and possibly destroying them. Since it had
no forces, however. Congress needed to decide on a plan for
some show of force to people in the western lands— both Indian
and squatter.
As a result of the inability of Washington and Hamilton
to create a standing army, on 3 June 1784 Congress asked (for
it had no power to demand) that the states of Pennsylvania,
Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey provide a total of 700
soldiers

for twelve-months

service on the

frontier.^* With

^Kohn, Eagle and Sword, pp. 57-60.
^^Fitzpatrick, ed. , The Writings of Georae Washington.
27:120-121. In a letter of 29 August 1783 to Governor George
Clinton, Washington expressed his concern over General von
Steuben's report to Washington dated 22 Aug 1783 in which von
Steuben indicated that the British were not leaving the forts.
^•^any authors see this force as the beginning of the
United States Army that has existed up to the present. This
theme is echoed in almost every secondary source that mentions
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this regiment. Congress had not created a true national army;
the power base of this

force remained

in the

states that

raised it and not with the national government. Congress could
only

request

that

the

states

send

the

troops.

In

fact,

Connecticut raised its troops too late for service, and New
York did not raise a n y T h i s
became

"permanent"

in April

First United States Regiment
1785

when,

with the

original

enlistments about to expire, the states permitted Congress to
enlist

regulars

for three

years

of

service.

Although

not

completely in compliance with Congress's authority to raise an
army under the Articles of Confederation,

this arrangement

provided the only military force of the national government in
the

frontier

areas

until

the

new

Constitution

came

into

operation.
Those

who

argued

against

a

standing

army

and

for

a

reliance on the militia did not do so out of a desire to
destroy

the

nation.^*

Many

had

fully

internalized

the

the topic. See Chambers, To Raise an Armv. p. 24, Kohn, Eaale
and Sword. p. 60, or Francis Prucha, The Sword of the
Republic; The United States Armv on the Frontier 1783-1846
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 9.
^John K. Mahon, "Pennsylvania and the Beginnings of the
Regular Army," Pennsvlvania Historv 21 (January 1954), 33-44.
^'congressman
Elbridge
Gerry
from
Marblehead,
Massachusetts often led the fight against a standing army. In
several
speeches to the Confederation Congress,
Gerry
emotionally warned of the threats to liberty a standing army
represented. He was a leading New England congressman and
often pulled all the New England Congressmen with him in
voting. The "Proclamation of 18 Oct 1783" in the Journals of
the Continental Congress provides a good example of both his
logic and style of expression.
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mythology of the embattled farmers of Lexington and Concord
and fully believed in the ability of their militia to defeat
regular

troops.

They knew

the

Continental

Army

played

a

major role in securing independence but saw a national army as
an emergency measure to be invoked only when the survival of
the republic demanded

it.

As with the debates

in America

before the Revolution, they saw in a standing army as great a
threat to their liberties as an invasion by a foreign power.
Whatever the drawbacks of the militia, it would always remain
a voice of the populace and could not act against the people,
for the people embodied the militia. With a standing army, the
national government possessed the thin edge of a wedge with
which slowly to destroy the liberty of the people. A standing
army gave Congress both the reason to collect taxes (to pay
for the army) and the means to enforce collection.
The regionalism of the United States also contributed to
the reliance on militia. The relatively wealthy New England
states saw no reason to send their well-equipped militia to
^’Charles Royster, A Revolutionary People at War: The
Continental Armv and American Character. 1775-1783 (Chapel
Hill: North Carolina Press, 1979), p. 333. Royster argues that
lack of virtue within the militia forced reliance on the
Continental Army.
’^Lawrence Cress, Citizens in Arms: The Armv and the
Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 46-47. Cress
argues that radical Whig rhetoric popular in the 1760s
continued to play a role in the political discourse of the
nation, especially in New York and New England. In Boston,
which had recent experience with regulars in the 1770s,
opposition to standing armies remained deeply ingrained in the
populace.
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the west to protect New York and Pennsylvania.

The poorer

states of the

focused on

South,

where militia duty often

control of slaves rather than Indians,
military

force

with

less

fear.

looked on a national

Many Southerners

saw

a

standing army as a way to protect their exposed frontier areas
without forcing free white men to accept army discipline. New
York,

with

border,

an

exposed

western

frontier,

an

international

and a dispute with Massachusetts over western New

York, wanted permission to form a state army to deal with its
problems. For more than a year. Congress stalled on New

York's

request.

States

With

the

formation

of

the First

United

Regiment, the United States in Congress Assembled did not see
any need to allow New York to create a standing army of its
own.
The militia in this period did exceptionally little aside
from providing an article of faith for those opposed to the
creation of a standing army. Only two incidents of any size
involved militia, and both underscored the problems of relying
wholly on the militia for the republic's military purposes.
From

Kentucky,

George

Rogers

Clark

led

an

unauthorized

expedition into the Ohio Valley against Indians using 1,200
state militia. However, many of the militiamen Clark drafted
for the expedition resisted— often with violence. The campaign
quickly collapsed; desertion and insubordination destroyed any
military effectiveness the expedition ever had. The Virginia
’’Kohn, Eagle and Sword, p. 58.
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government soon called Clark back to explain his actions. This
aborted adventure served to underscore the difficulties in
using part-time soldiers in an area far from their homes, and
for purposes not immediately affecting them.
Late in the summer of 1786, another incident involving
the militia proved to have a more far reaching impact on the
country

and

its

fundamental

political

system.

Shays's

Rebellion resulted from the unequal distribution of wealth
between

eastern

and

western

Massachusetts.

A

shortage

of

specie caused by Britain's demand for hard currency from the
newly independent United States hit New England especially
hard. Western farmers, used to a barter-based economy, became
desperate when their eastern commercial creditors began to
demand

currency,

and

almost

none

was

available.

This

desperation soon led to a civil war in western Massachusetts.
Daniel Shays built an army from the angry farmers of western
Massachusetts. The Shaysites claimed that they wanted only to
prevent the courts from seizing land and imprisoning farmers
for

debt,

but

the

threat

of

anarchy

terrified

the

state

government in Boston. The situation became even more dangerous
for leaders in eastern Massachusetts when the local militia of

^^Most of the summary of Clark's expedition was gleaned
from Leonard C. Helderman, “The Northwest Expedition of George
Rogers Clark, 1786-1787,”
Mississippi Valiev Historical
Review 25 (December 1938), 317-334.
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western Massachusetts failed to end the insurrection.^^ The
affair exposed a serious weakness within

both the militia

system and the framework for a national army outlined in the
Articles.
Without

a

regular

professional

army,

the

government depended on the states to furnish the

national
soldiers

needed to end insurrections. However, the people of the area
who were supposed to form the militia to quell the rebellion
either joined the Shaysites, or at least remained in sympathy
with them. The national government feared for the arsenal in
Springfield, where surplus military stores from the revolution
had been stored by the Continental Congress. Shays arrived in
Springfield with an army of 1,100 men and forced the state
supreme court out of the city. When the insurgents decided to
take

the

federal

arsenal,

the

national

government

could

initially do little to prevent it. The handful of national
soldiers guarding the arsenal were greatly outnumbered. Only
the actions of the few loyal militia drawn from the market
towns of western Massachusetts, and the confusion within the
approaching Shaysite columns,
arsenal

before

Massachusetts.

the

arrival

prevented the capture of the
of

a

force

from

eastern

Panic swept Connecticut and New Hampshire as

”David P. Szatraary, Shavs' Rebellion; The Making of an
Agrarian
Insurrection
(Amherst:
The
University
of
Massachusetts Press, 1980), p. 80. When Shays's forces
surrounded the Worcester county courthouse, the responses from
Worcester militiamen to attempts to organize them for
protecting the court ranged from evasion of duty to "flat
denial."
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the rebellion grew. Massachusetts finally ended the rebellion
without

Congressional

assistance

after

a

half

year

of

destruction and fear. To destroy Shays's army, enough militia
men and volunteers from the eastern part of the state had to
be mobilized

and sent to the western part.

Congress,

and

Washington, could do little but watch anxiously.^
In the end, state military forces ended the rebellion. At
least in one sense, proponents of the militia system could
feel vindicated by the outcome; an insurrection by a minority
of citizens of the state had been controlled by the majority.
However, leaders in eastern Massachusetts saw the impotence of
the national government in keeping order and ending anarchy.
The initial failure of the local militia to end the rebellion
also alarmed many proponents of the militia. Many militiamen
of western Massachusetts flouted militia discipline and either
disobeyed orders or joined the rebels. From the frustration of
the

Confederation

Congress

in

the

crisis,

and

the

new

willingness of New England leaders to allow a ready force, the
Constitutional Convention overcame the earlier qualms over a
standing

federal

army

when

they

met

to

strengthen

the

^Ibid., pp. 102-103., Also, Prucha, Sword. p. 6. The
Confederation Congress eventually authorized the calling of
additional national troops— including 660 from Massachusetts—
ostensibly to fight Indians. However, Knox confidentially
wrote that he had assisting the government of Massachusetts in
mind when he asked for the additional troops. Eventually, the
state forces were able to end the rebellion before the new
national forces intervened, and only two companies of the new
national forces remained on active duty to guard the
Springfield arsenal.
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government under the Articles in the spring of 1787
With the new federal Constitution of 1787, the framers
sought

to

apparent

correct

under

Constitution,

the

weaknesses

the Articles

of

of

the

militia

Confederation.

In

system
the

Congress received expressed permission

new

” [t]o

raise and support armies” without limiting that power to times
of

war

or

immediate

threat

thereof.

The

only

check

on

Congress's power to raise armies concerned the financing of
them. The budget could not be appropriated for more than two
years at a time.

Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the same section

concerned the militia

in the new federal system.

received permission for "calling forth"
militia

to

execute

the

laws

of

Congress

(federalizing)

the

Union,

"the

suppress

insurrections, and repel invasion." The Constitution gave the
position of Commander-in-Chief of both the army of the United
States, and also the militia when in federal service, to the
president.^^
In line with the suggestions of Hamilton and Washington
for

strengthening

the militia.

Congress

received

explicit

^^George Billias, Elbridqe Gerry; Founding Father and
Republican Statesman (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1776), pp. 149152. Gerry had a fear of mob violence almost as strong as his
fear of monarchical tyranny. When the rebellion began, Gerry
saw the national government's potential response as the
greater threat to liberty. Later he became reconciled to the
idea that central power needed to be increased to prevent
anarchy.
“United States
paragraph 12.

Constitution,

Article

I,

^^Ibid., Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 1.
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permission to organize, discipline, and arm the militia of the
states,

and to govern any part of the militia

service.

States received the rights

in federal

to commission militia

officers and to enforce the federal standards in training the
militia.^*

As

in

the

Articles

of

Confederation,

the

Constitution forbade the states from keeping standing armies
in

peacetime

without

federal

permission.^’

Lest

future

generations misread federal authority over the state militia
to mean that the federal government had the power either to
abolish or forbid the states to keep a militia, the Bill of
Rights

specifically

gave

the

states

the

right

to

keep

a

militia.*®
The evolution from a wartime national army constituted
from regiments organized by the states,

as outlined in the

Articles of Confederation, to the standing army authorized in
the Constitution,

must be seen against the backdrop of the

experience of confederation. The Articles came into existence
in the middle of a struggle against Parliament's power over
the colonies. The document framed during this time reflected
the desire to be free and independent states.

The militia

contributed greatly to winning the War for Independence, but
the

Continental

Army

won

the

key

battles

that

assured

^*Ibid., Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 16.
^’Articles of Confederation, Article VI, section
Constitution, Article I, Section 10, Paragraph 3.
^^Constitution, Amendment II.
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independence.^* However, Americans did not fight the war to
replace one perceived tyranny with another.
retained

their

traditional

standing army

in peacetime.

force

Englishmen's
This

in

New

England.

In

populace,

the

militia,

sounded

As such,

suspicion

they
of

a

sentiment had particular

theory,

the

idea

practical.

of

an

Reality

armed
showed

otherwise.
The new nation expected to pay off its war debt, and pay
for much of the national expenses, with the sale of western
lands. But no militia could be drawn from an area belonging to
the

states

in common and having no

legal white

settlers.

Shays's Rebellion demonstrated the drawbacks of the militia
for ensuring domestic tranquility. Hardened to the realities
of

national

sovereignty,

the

framers

of

the

Constitution

adopted a dual structure of United States land forces. The
federal government created a standing army,
retained the right to maintain

a militia

and the states
that

could both

augment the federal force and serve the state. The Militia Act
of 1792 put the constitutional ideal into law.
However, the enthusiasm needed to maintain the militia
soon waned.
between

18

Although
and

45

to

the

Act

of

1792

arm themselves

required
and

attend

all

males

a yearly

'"in his The Militarv Policy of the United States
(Washington: GPO, 1907), a book in no way sympathetic to the
concept or reality of militia, Emory Upton estimated that the
Continental Army fielded a total of 231,771 soldiers during
the course of the war, while the militia fielded 164,087. (p.
58) .
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muster,

this law soon fell into d i s u s e . D u r i n g wartime,

related

concept— the

Volunteers,

first

Volunteers— filled

authorized

in

the

1806,

militia

rested

on

a

role.

dubious

constitutional g r o u n d . W h i l e the president has broad powers
to "raise and support armies," the Volunteers tended to be
regiments organized from companies raised at the local level,
with

officers

below

the

rank

of

general

receiving

their

commissions from the governors of their respective states.^
Although the
regiments

Constitution reserved the authority to raise

and

commission

officers

to

the

Volunteers were not true militia.'*^ Instead,

states,

the

the Volunteers

were usually state forces raised for a specific period of
federal service.
The militia, as proposed by the Founding Fathers, never
existed

in

the

United

States.

The

experience

in

Revolutionary War came closest, but after independence,

the
the

federal and state governments neglected to enforce the militia
laws.

Instead,

what was

commonly

called

"militia"

was

in

reality organizations of volunteers organized on the local
level.

These men formed and joined companies either out of

*^USSL. Militia Act of 1792, Second Congress. Sess. I. Ch.
XXXIII. sec. 1.
*^USSL. "An Act authorizing a detachment from the Militia
of the United States." Ninth Congress. Sess. I. Chap XXXII,
sec 2, 5.
^Constitution, Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 12.
‘*®Ibid. , Paragraph 16.
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patriotism, enjoyment, or local contacts, but not out of legal
obligation.^

Therein

began

a

legal

fiction:

the

states

legitimized and supported these organizations, and in return
these organizations performed traditional militia functions
for the state. With these voluntary companies to assist the
state

government

disaster relief,

in

strike-breaking,

riot-control,

and

the states were relieved of the burden of

enforcing a true militia law. In the years after the Civil
War, states increasingly relied on these companies to disrupt
organized labor during strikes. Their federal mission would
not develop until after the begining of the twentieth century.
The transformation of these so-called militia units into
the modern National Guard lasted the better part of a century.
The first use of the term "National Guard" came in 1824 when
certain units from New York adopted the title on the occasion
of Lafayette's return to the United S t a t e s . B y the end of
the century, only three states had not adopted the term for
their part-time state military forces.'** Whatever the name,
these

state-based companies

during the Mexican,
regrouped,

Civil,

did not

enter

federal

and Spanish wars.

Instead,

often with mostly the same members,

'•^Frederick P. Todd, "Our National
Affairs 5 (Summer 1941): 73-86, 152-170.

service
they

as units of

Guard,"

Militarv

'*'^Col. Emmons Clark, Historv of the Seventh Regiment of
New York. 1806-1889. (New York: 1890), 1:105.
48iiThe Organized Militia of the
Department Document #32 (1897) p. 283.

United

States,"
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state Volunteers that were mustered into federal service, or
as US Volunteers. This vaguely defined system for national
defense that would last until the Militia Act of 1903 and the
National Defense Act of 1916 again changed the paradigm.
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II. The Preparedness Debate

Leaders in America had been concerned with the proper
balance

of

military

force

and

preparedness

since

the

Revolutionary War. The Militia Act of 1792 had been an attempt
by the First Congress to provide a credible second line of
defense without bankrupting the country or resorting to a
militarization

of

American

society.

These

two

themes—

credibility without militarization— became the focus of the
preparedness

debate

of

the

early

twentieth

century.

In

retrospect, the Spanish-American War represented the swan-song
of the old system, and the Great War marked the dawn of the
modern

American

military

establishment.

However,

in

the

decades before the sinking of the USS Maine, the debate had
already crystallized into two main groups. Both groups agreed
that militia remained negligible as long as states retained
control over any aspects of them. The two groups differed over
the proper mix of regulars and reservists and the time needed
to turn an American civilian into a competent soldier.
In

the

Constitution,

century

following

Congress made no

the

adoption

substantial changes

of

the

to the

Militia Act of 1792. However, in the years following the War

26
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of 1812, the militia as an institution fell into disuse.' Few
Americans, including Congressmen, saw any need for citizens to
waste

time

profitable

drilling
pursuits

when

no

danger

threatened

beckoned.^ Instead,

the

army

and

more

expanded

during the Mexican, Civil, and Spanish-American Wars through
the

institution

of

the

United

States

Volunteers.

The

Volunteers, not mentioned in the Constitution, resembled more
the military system envisioned by the framers of the Articles
of Confederation. Volunteer regiments usually consisted of ten
companies of roughly eighty men locally recruited.

The men

from each company elected their officers; the governor of the
state would appoint the regimental officers; and the regiment
would

then

be

mustered

into

federal

service

for

a

prior

agreed-on period.^ The Regular Army, dwarfed during the Civil
War by the Volunteers, remained intact, although individual
officers could get leaves of absence to accept commissions
with the state-based Volunteers. In the years after the Civil
War, increased professionalism within the Regular Army led to

'Martha Derthick,
The National Guard
in Politics
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 15.; Weigley,
Historv of United States Army, pp. 156-157.
^In slave holding areas, a greater percentage of the
white male population participated in the organized militia.
However, this formed more a posse against the threat of slave
insurrection than a true military force.
^Volunteer Act of 1806. Twelfth Congress. Sess. II. Ch.
32. sec. 2-5. This was the first act authorizing the president
to call for Volunteers corps from the states.
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a debate over the future composition of the wartime army.^ In
the preparedness debate that began in America after the summer
of

1914,

became
balance

the

somewhat

urgent
of

abstract

arguments

trained

citizen-soldiers

as

speculations

the

nation

professional

of

sought

soldiers

the
the

and

1880s
proper

patriotic

in a world that suddenly seemed far more

dangerous.
The first group to challenge the status quo followed the
teachings of Emory Upton,
General William T.

a Civil War hero and protege of

Sherman.

Although Upton's The Militarv

Policv of the United States would not be published until 1904,
copies of it passed through the War Department during the
decades before the turn of the century.^ Upton's work combined
his

interpretation

infatuation

with

of

the

American
German

military

military.

history

Arguing

with

that

his

state

control of, and influence on, militia would always make it
unreliable to the federal army as an effective reserve, Upton
sought a long-term reserve force wholly under federal control.
Regardless

of

the

geographical,

cultural,

and

political

differences between Germany and the United States, the concept

^Edward M. Coffman, The Old Armv:
American Armv in Peacetime. 1784-1898
University Press, 1986), pp. 269-272.

A Portrait
(New York;

of the
Oxford

*Emory Upton, The Militarv Policv of the United States
(Washington, GPO, 1904); also, Stephen Ambrose, Uoton and the
Armv (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964).
The final chapter, "Influence," traces some of the effects of
Upton's unpublished work on the army from his death in March
1881 until the Great War.
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of

locally

anathema

recruited

to

Uptonites

the

and

disciples

sought

total

and

leading

organizing#

locally
of

supported

Emory

Upton.

federal

control

of

non-Regular

any

units

became

Instead#

over

the

recruiting#

forces

to

be

employed in war.
Although written for the educated layman, Upton's book
remained out of reach for many Americans. Harris Dickson, a
convinced Uptonite,

attempted to popularize the lessons of

Militarv Policv in a much shorter work. The Unpopular Historv
of the United States bv Uncle Sam Himself.^ To make his point#
Dickson assumed the role of a chastising Uncle Sam who warned
Americans

of

the

folly

of

the

militia

myth.

From

the

Revolutionary War through the nineteenth century. Uncle Sam
showed the unreliability of militia in war. At the end. Uncle
Sam

praised

the

recently

established

mechanism

for

a

"selective draft" as the only truly democratic way to defend
the nation. He urged that the nation should train its youth in
basic military skills so that they could reap the benefits of
patriotism

and

exercise

in

peacetime,

become

soldiers in less time upon reaching adulthood,

competent

and perhaps

avoid being slaughtered in wartime.
An even closer emulation of Upton's book can be found in
The Militarv Unoreparedness of the United States: A History of
American Land Forces from Colonial Times until June 1. 1915 by
“Harris Dickson, The Unpopular Historv of the United
States bv Uncle Sam Himself as Recorded in Uncle Sam's Own
Words (New York: Frederick A Stokes Co., 1917).
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Frederic

HuidekoperThis

book

attempted

to

improve

and

update Upton's work. The author claimed to have filled the
holes in Upton's Militarv Policv. which he may have done, but
at the expense of clarity. Like Upton, the main purpose of the
book, as obvious from the title, was to show that the nation
constantly fell short in military preparedness and later paid
in

blood.

Also

in

line

with

Upton,

the

book

showed

the

constant weakness of the militia system that resulted from
state

control.

The

book

concluded

with

Huidekoper's

suggestions for improving American military preparedness. Like
many in the debate, he called for an enlarged Regular Army,
which would serve as a school for a body of federal reserves.
After two years active service,
reserves

for

five

years.

a soldier would enter the

Under

Huidekoper's

system,

the

militia, as a state-controlled force, would end.
However,
embedded

in

the
the

concept
American

of

the

citizen-soldier

psyche.

Certain

high

remained
ranking

soldiers, led by General Leonard Wood, reached the opposite
conclusions from Upton.

To Wood,

the average American male

could be transformed into a competent soldier with only a few
months of intensive training.

The better element

(ie:

the

educated classes) of society could be made into officers in a
slightly longer period. Wood, however, remained something of
^Frederic Huidekoper, Militarv Preparedness of the United
States; A Historv of American Land Forces from Colonial times
until June 1. 1915 (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1915). The
introduction of the book was written by Major General Leonard
Wood.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

30

a maverick in the army. Not a West Pointer, Wood received his
original commission as a doctor in the army medical corps.
During the Spanish-American War, Theodore Roosevelt and his
Rough Riders impressed Wood both with their unfamiliarity with
military procedures, and with their ability to follow orders
and accomplish missions. A decade later, in the preparedness
debate.

Wood placed great faith in the citizen-soldier.

To

train educated civilians in the rudiments of military life, he
began to hold a series of summer training camps, the first of
which he established at Plattsburg, New York. At these camps.
Wood began to put his faith into practice, often with noted
success. The educated men adapted well to military life, and
learned the rudiments of soldiering faster than most regulars
believed they would.*
Throughout this period. Wood spoke frequently on the need
for Universal Military Service. Three of his speeches appeared
in book form in The Militarv Obligation of Citizenship.’ As
the title implied. Wood's belief that citizenship carried an
obligation of military service provided a recurring theme of
the three speeches. In "The Policy of the United States in
Raising and Maintaining Armies," delivered at Princeton on 15

*John Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers; The Plattsburg
Training Camp Movement. 1913-1920 (Lexington: The University
Press
of Kentucky,
1972) ; also Jack C.
Lane,
Armed
Progressive: General Leonard Wood (San Rafael, California;
Presidio Press, 1978), pp. 193-196.
^Leonard Wood, The Militarv Obligation of Citizenship
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1915).
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April

1915,

Wood

argued

that

" [t]he

experience

of

the

Revolution should have taught us that it is not safe in real
war to depend on Volunteers."*® Instead,

he maintained,

the

United States needed to require military service from all, as
the army saw fit.

Perhaps facing reality.

transformed between the

first speech

Wood's position

in the book

and the

third. On 15 June 1915, Wood gave a speech entitled "The Civil
Obligation of the Army" at St. Paul's School. Only two months
after calling for the elimination of the Volunteer system,
Wood instead outlined his plan to improve the Volunteers. If
the Volunteers were to be of any use in the next war, "we must
have a great body of 35,000 or 40,000 reserve officers trained
and

ready

to

serve

as

officers

of

Volunteers."**

Wood

accepted, at least partially, that the Volunteers would most
likely continue

to have a role

in the American military.

However, his summer camps for training reserve officers would
ensure that in future wars, the Volunteers would be led by
officers with some military training. In the same speech, he
remarked

on

his

admiration

for

the

Swiss

systems of military instruction at school,
period

in the reserves

for all

the

and

combined with a

able-bodied.

abandoned his desire for universal service.

Australian

He

never

During the same

period. Maxwell Van Zandt Woodhull, a former Brevet BrigadierGeneral of Volunteers from the Civil War, published West Point
*®Ibid., p. 10
**Ibid. , p. 63
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in our Next War:
Armv.

The Only Wav

to Create

and Maintain an

In this book, he explained that with a year or two of

service. Volunteers were as competent soldiers as Regulars.
However, with the advances in shipping and the complexity of
war, the nation could no longer rely on Volunteers. The army
needed to be able to fight on the first day of a war. With
obligations in Alaska, the Canal Zone, the Philippines, and
other

areas

outside

the

United

States,

the

army

remained

wholly insufficient for its role, whether in war or peace. To
remedy this, Woodhull proposed an immediate expansion of the
Regular Army. Then, drawing on his Civil War experiences, he
proposed the

establishment

of

a

federal

corps

of

trained

reserve officers to lead an expanded wartime army. To this
end, he hoped to modify West Point so that some students could
attend a two year program,

after which they would re-enter

civilian life. During a war, they would serve as officers for
the expanded army.
The

problem

of

a

tiny

Regular

Army

with

far-flung

military obligations also inspired a curious book by Hudson
Maxim

entitled

Defenseless

America.

Written

with

the

blessings of General Wood, whose letter to Maxim appears in
the

book,

Maxim's work

aimed at awakening the public

and

‘^Maxwell Woodhull, West Point in our Next War; The Only
Way to Create and Maintain an Armv (New York: G.P.Putnam's
Sons, 1915).
Hudson Maxim, Defenseless America (New York: Hearst's
International Library Co., 1915).
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government to the dangers of modern war.

Maxim took great

pains to show the vulnerability of the nation and urged a
large military build-up.

Without naming the potential foe,

Maxim warned of the calamity of a future invasion of American
territory. Using the example of the Great War, he showed that
America
soldiers

needed

to

begin

immediately

if

producing more
disaster

were

guns,
not

to

planes,

and

befall

the

nation.
Another book, written before the Great War began but not
published until 1915, also envisioned the Regular Army as a
training school for an expanded war-time army. This book. The
American Armv. by William Harding Carter, traced what he saw
as a fundamental shift in the role of the Regular Army.*'* To
Carter, the Regulars no longer trained to fight as an army,
but to prepare

reservists

for an

expanded army.

In

other

words, the Regular Army existed as a corps of instructors for
an expanded war-time army. Retired Commanding General Nelson
Miles

also

skeleton

subscribed

from

which

to
to

this
expand

idea
the

of

the

army

regulars
in

as

wartime.

a
In

testimony to Congress in February of 1916, Miles pressed for
a forces of between 140,000 and 150,000, which would expand in
war

to

a

half

million

men.

Miles

bitterly

opposed

a

conscripted federal reserve army, which he saw as an attempt

*‘*William Carter, The American Armv
Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1915), pp. 31-49.

(Indianapolis:
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to Germanize America.
The opposite approach came from "The Debater's Handbook
Series" volume. National Defense, which specifically called
for universal
active

duty

training,

and

a

followed

longer period

by at

least

in the

one year

reserves

for

on
all

males.’® This book presented a sampling of arguments on the
preparedness

issue,

but

all

concluded

with

a

call

for

increases in overall national readiness. The bibliography at
the beginning listed pacifist groups and publications as well
as

preparedness

groups,

but

the

essays

all

supported

an

expanded military.
Not all books from the debate carried a strong agenda.
Less

biased

and

more

informative

was

Militarv

and

Naval

America by Captain Harrison Kerrick of the army. . While he
did use the first chapter to show with various statistics the
deficiency of the United States in all areas from artillery to
ships, a break-down of every aspect of the American military
fills most of the book. Kerrick explained not only the various
branches of the army and navy, but also the militia, military
colleges. Red Cross, Y.M.C.A., and Boy Scouts. Rather than a

’^Robert Wooster, Nelson A. Miles and the Twilight of the
Frontier Armv (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993),
pp. 260—261.
’®Agnes Van Valkenburgh,
ed., Selected Articles on
National Defense including Compulsory Militarv Service. Vol.
2 (New York: The H.W. Wilson Co., 1917).
’^Harrison Kerrick, Militarv and Naval America (New York:
Doubleday, Page, and Co., 1915).
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political tract, Kerrick's book filled the role of primer of
the total military resources of the United States.
One

American

probably

spoke

louder

on

the

issue

of

preparedness than any other, Theodore Roosevelt. In his book.
Fear God and Take Your Own Part, he mused on a number of
aspects

that

bothered

him.** Although

he

could

not

decide

which problem loomed larger— Mexico or Germany— he definitely
found fault with the president's handling of both problems. In
the

chapter

"A

Sword

For

Defence", Roosevelt

universal service in both peace and war.
what

he

called

the

"failed"

system

of

called

for

He railed against
Great

Britain—

volunteers— and instead urged a system of obligatory service,
as in Germany, Switzerland, and Australia. He also pushed for
an expansion of the Plattsburg Camps, which his son attended,
as well as for military instruction in the public schools.
Perhaps most surprising, given his fame with the Rough Riders
and his later attempts to recruit a regiment for the Great
War, was his critique of the Volunteers. He explained that the
inequities of the Volunteer system prevented it from meeting
the

nation's

military

needs.

Under

the

Volunteer

system,

patriotic and virtuous men carried the burden for the lazy and
timid.

The

preparedness

issue,

however,

filled

only

one

section of the book, for Roosevelt's mind soon dashed off to
tackle the problems of hyphenated Americanism, the treachery

‘^Theodore Roosevelt, Fear God and Take Your Own Part (New
York: George H. Doran Co., 1916).
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of pacifism, Armenia, and again, Mexico.
For reasons unconnected with anti-militarism, a powerful
lobbying

group

in

Washington

opposed

the

creation

of

a

federally controlled reserve. The National Guard Association
lobbied for recognition as the second line of defense, behind
the

Regular

Army.

Unfortunately

for

the

National

Guard,

Attorney General George W. Wickersham issued an opinion in
February 1912 that as militia,

National Guard could not be

used beyond the borders of the United S t a t e s . C a r t e r ,
well

as

the

National

Constitutional barrier.

Guard

itself,

bemoaned

as

this

Fearing that they might be shunted

aside in favor of a new federal reserve, the National Guard
Association lobbied hard for a solution to the Constitutional
barrier,

and

to

of

the

secure recognition as the

second

line of

defense.
One

works

from

the

period

that

opposed

the

preparation movement was Preparedness: The American versus The
Military

Programme

by

William

Hull.^*

After

a

careful

examination of the threat to the United States by a first rate
‘’George Kearney, ed., Official Opinions of the Attorneys
General of the United States Advising the President and Heads
of
Departments
in relation
to Their
Official
Duties
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1913), 29:322-329.
Attorney General George W. Wickersham expressed his opinions
in a letter to the Secretary of War on 17 February 1912.
^“Derthick, The National Guard in Politics, pp. 28-32.
^‘william Hull, The American versus The Militarv Programme
(New York: Fleming H. Revel 1 Co., 1916), pp. 268-271. Hull was
a professor of History and International Relations at
Swarthmore Co1lege.
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power, Hull reasoned that America could not remain free and
still meet the threat by military means. He explained that the
numbers of men needed and training required would result in a
Prussianization of American society. Partial preparation only
wasted time, money,

and later,

lives.

Instead,

Hull argued

that America could best help to end the war in Europe, and war
in general,
purpose

by setting an example for the world.

for the United States military

should

be

The only
for the

policing of the areas under United States' sovereignty but not
part of a state,
limit

on the

and for the patrolling of the three-mile

ocean

for pirates.

Hull

fell

short when

he

attempted to explain how a foreign invader would be stopped.
He envisioned a world that followed America's example and one
that would have international agreements on peace. Beyond that
hope, he offered no ideas for reaction if an invasion actually
occurred.
By

1915,

President Woodrow Wilson had

shifted from a

traditional Progressive position of opposition to militarism
to one in favor of preparedness.^^ Although he reassured the
National Guard that he had no plans to dissolve it, he had
become an Uptonite.^ In response to the war in Europe, Wilson
backed a plan by Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison that
called for an expansion of the Regular Army, increases in the

^^Arthur S. Link, Wilson; Confusions and Crises 1915-1916
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 21.
23

Ibid., p. 21,
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navy,

and

a

large

control.^ To

reserve

placate

the

force

completely

National

Guard,

under

the

receive a slight increase in federal support,

federal

Guard

would

but would be

relegated to police duties. However, traditional suspicion of
military

expansion

remained

strong,

especially

in

the

president's own party, the Democrats. The Secretary of State,
William Jennings Bryan, broke with the administration to fight
against

the

president's

plan.

Bryan

felt,

as

did

many

opponents to preparedness, that Americans would fight if the
nation were invaded.

However,

as no nation seemed about to

invade, preparedness would be the first step on road towards
European-style

militarism.^

With

massive

opposition

from

within his own party, and the resignation of Secretary of War
Garrison, Wilson's attempts at improving the defenses of the
nation appeared dead by February 1916.
The

preparedness

debate

continued

unresolved

until

President Wilson asked for and received a declaration of war
on the central powers. However,

some consensus was reached.

The country as a whole seemed unwilling to support universal
military training, but it did support voluntary training. In
the years before the Great War, Americans found conscription
as repugnant as it had been to their grandfathers. Americans
opposed forcing men into uniform before an actual state of war
existed.

By the time the U.S.

declared war,

little of the

^Ibid., p. 18.
^Ibid., pp. 30-33.
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eventual compromise for preparedness had been implemented. The
partisans of preparedness had not devised a plan for a nation
at war, but a nation at peace. Thus, Wilson turned to a very
different model for the organization of the army in the Great
War. However, some of the goals of the preparedness advocates
became part of the National Defense Act of 1916.

Only the

short time span between its passage and America's entry into
war nullified most of the significance of the preparedness
measures.
The National Defense Act of 1916 compromised between the
various schools of thought on preparedness. Wood's training
camps received official recognition. The National Guard took
a dual oath and became the official second line of defense.
The Volunteer system remained in theory, with an expansion of
R.O.T.C.

and

Plattsburg-type

camps

to

train

its

future

officers.^ The realities of mobilization against the Central
Powers

altered

preparedness

had

the

plan

brought

somewhat,
to

the

but

the

foreground

debate
most

of

over
the

proposed changes that the National Defense Act would later
embody. However, a vague and distant threat of war from Europe
could not incite Americans to alter the basic structure of
their army.
Mexican

Instead,

a very near and real problem on the

border provided the

catalyst

for

implementing the

changes proposed during the debate over preparedness.

^^ational Defense Act of 1916,
Sess. I. Ch. 134. sec 37.

Sixty-fourth Congress.
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III. The Mexican Border as a Catalyst for Change

The

debate

realization
However,

over

that

the

preparedness
military

reflected

system

needed

a

growing

adjustment.

real change would come only after the old system

proved unable to meet the defense needs of the nation.

Far

more than the potential for American involvement in the war in
Europe, real problems on the Mexican border demonstrated to
Americans
Regular

that

Army

the

was

old

no

relationship

longer

between

adequate

to

the

militia
mission

and
of

protecting the United States and allowing the president to
project American military power.
The military system created in the early days of the
republic

served

fundamentally

unchanged

throughout

the

nineteenth century. The United States fought the War of 1812,
the Mexican War, the Civil War, and the Spanish-American War,
plus a few Indian Wars, with little change to the system. As
was the case in the

1780s,

problems

on the border of the

United States exposed the weaknesses in the system. The use of
Volunteers

in

the

Mexican

and

Spanish

Wars

averted

the

Constitutional problem of using militia outside the territory
of the United States, but after the Spanish-American War the
National

Guard

replaced

the Volunteers

as

the method

40
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expanding the army

in wartime. In the second decade of

the

twentieth century,

the Mexican border,

rather than the

old

land forces of

the

Northwest,

presented a problem for the

United States that the existing structure was ill-equipped to
handle.
Before the outbreak of revolution in 1910, Mexico was
regarded as a model of pre-industrialized stability. Before
stability

returned

awakening

on

the

to

Mexico, America

inadequacy

of

the

would

Regular

get
Army

a

rude

and

the

National Guard. Almost alone among western powers, the United
States had no federal military reserves— no established system
for expanding the small standing army into a large force if
needed quickly.
Problems

with

Mexico,

combined

with

the

territorial

expanse of the American empire, soon exposed the inadequacy of
the old system. With most of the Regular Army troops based in
the United States on an expeditionary force into Mexico, the
president called the entire National Guard to the Mexican
border to prevent more crossings by Mexican guerrillas. While
the American army was occupied on the border and in Mexico,
events in Europe drew the United States closer to world war.
America faced this situation with no reserves left.
Before the United States entered the European war, Mexico
provided a small-scale test for the American defense system.
Although the actual combat in Mexico more closely resembled
the later Indian campaigns than the European war, the campaign
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in Mexico allowed the army to glimpse the future. The American
expedition took airplanes,

motor vehicles,

and radios into

Mexico. Both Regular Army and National Guard officers received
experience

in

experience

with

General

leading
Mexico,

large
the

numbers

of

American

men.

Without

Expeditionary

Pershing took to France would have been

far

the

Force
less

prepared or competent.
In 1910, the Mexican president, Porfirio Diaz, dictator
for thirty years, announced that he would step down and that
elections would be held. Francisco Madero, a believer in legal
process, announced he would run for the office. Diaz promptly
had him arrested

and announced his

decision to run

again

despite his earlier promise to step down. Without the ability
to change the government by peaceful means, Madero took up the
cause of Revolution.*
However,

with the federal army behind him,

Diaz

soon

crushed the rebellion. Madero was not the only revolutionary.
Francisco "Pancho" Villa and Pascual Orozco in the north, and
Emiliano Zapata in the south, took up the struggle against
Diaz.

The balance of power in Mexico shifted from beneath

Diaz, as he lost control of the countryside and his poorly led
army proved unequal to the task of keeping him in power. With
mounting forces against Diaz, his thirty-year rule collapsed,

‘Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution. Vol. 1, Porfirians.
Liberals and Peasants (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1986), pp. 55-71.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43

and he fled the country. Madero then became president.^
Madero, a moderate, proved unable or unwilling to push
through

the

drastic

reform

measures

demanded

by

the

revolutionaries. Eventually, the army rebelled, and President
Madero called in the alcoholic General Victoriano Huerta to
put down the uprising. After a ten-day battle in Mexico City,
Huerta switched sides and had Madero shot. Huerta then claimed
the presidency of Mexico. The United States never recognized
the Huerta government.^
The assassination of Madero threw Villa

into fits of

rage. A new rebellion against against this blatantly illegal
seizure

of

power

eventually

put

the

Constitutionalist

Venustiano Carranza in the presidency. Never happy with peace.
Villa continued to rebel against the central government in
Mexico City from his native state of Chihuahua on the Texas
border.
From

the

start,

the

U.S.-Mexican

border

played

an

important role in the revolution.* On the American side of the
border,

revolutionaries plotted

in safety.

Revolutionaries

^Ibid., pp. 171-244.
^Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico; Europe, the
United States, and the Mexican Revolution (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 158-162.
*Katz, The Secret War in Mexico, p.
Mexican Revolution, p. 331.

159;
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could buy arms and ammunition from American dealers.^ Across
the border. Villa could sell his rustled cattle to raise money
for his army.

But the border could also be a disadvantage.

Exiled members of the old Mexican ruling class could interfere
with the internal affairs of Mexico from the comfort of San
Antonio or El Paso.

The United States government could at

least hinder the arms trade with factions out of favor. Every
bullet hole north of the border brought the threat of American
intervention to restore order by force.®
The

threat

was

not

an

empty

one.

Under

the

Monroe

Doctrine, the United States assumed the responsibility to act
on behalf of the European powers in the New World. With the
United

States

hostile

to

the

idea

of

direct

European

involvement, the European powers pressed the United States to
protect international investments in Mexico.

In April 1914,

the American navy seized the Mexican port city of Veracruz,
the invasion route during the Mexican-American War,

over a

perceived slight against the U.S.S. Dolphin, when the local
garrison refused to present a twenty-one gun salute to the
American

flag.

Nerves

had

already

been

strained

over

the

arrest of a group of American sailors as they came ashore and
over the presence of a German cargo ship suspected of carrying
®Linda B. Hall and Don M. Coerver, Revolution and the
Border (Albuquerque; University of New Mexico Press, 1988),
pp. 16-19, 25.
®John S. D. Eisenhower, Intervention!; The United States
and theMexican Revolution 1913-1917 (New York; W. W. Norton
and Company, 1993), p. 191.
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arms. Later, the United States Army took over occupation of
the

city

from

governments

of

the

navy

and

Argentina,

Marine

Brazil,

Corps.
and

Eventually

Chile

the

mediated

a

settlement, and the army left in late November.^
In 1915, after breaking with Carranza, Villa suffered a
series

of

defeats

at

the

hands

of

the

Constitutionalist

General Alvaro Obregon. During April, Villa lost two battles
at Celaya,

followed in May by a defeat at Leon.

The final

battle in this series came that July in Aguascalientes. Each
time, Obregon used the modern tools of warfare— the trench,
barbed wire, and machine guns— to destroy Villa's army in the
same manner that Europeans were destroying each other in the
Great War.

Obregon goaded Villa's vanity and Villa reacted

accordingly— launching massed assaults until his army lay in
heaps in the area northwest of Mexico City.*
Villa gathered the remnants of his army and returned to
northern Sonora. In early November, the battle at Agua Prieta,
across the border from Douglas,

Arizona,

what

and prestige.’ To

was

matters,

left
during

of Villa's
the

army

battle.

Villa

finally destroyed

learned

that

compound
President

Wilson had granted official recognition to the government of
Carranza.

Villa

also

learned

that

the

United

States

had

^Katz, The Secret War in Mexico, pp. 196-202.
*John Mason Hart, Revolutionarv Mexico: The Coming and
Process of the Mexican Revolution (Berkeley: University of
california Press, 1987), p. 311.
’Knight, The Mexican Revolution, p. 327-328.
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allowed the Constitutionalists to reinforce the border town of
Agua Prieta by use of trains passing through United States'
territory.For

Villa,

the Americans

now provided

both

a

target for his anger and a chance to win back his honor in the
eyes of the people of northern Mexico."
In mid-January of 1916, an event in the town of Santa
Ysabel completely changed Villa's reputation in the United
States."

Previously Villa

enjoyed

the

image

of

a Mexican

Robin Hood. After Santa Ysabel, Americans saw him as a blood
thirsty killer of United States citizens.
From November

1915,

the Carranza

government had been

assuring American mining companies that the violence of the
Revolution was over and that operations at the mines could
continue. In January of 1916, the Cusi Mining company sent a
group of American and Mexican employees from El Paso into
Chihuahua to reopen the mines. At the cattle station of Santa
Ysabel,

west

of Chihuahua

city,

a blockade

on the tracks

stopped the train. A party of Mexicans, under Colonel Pablo
Lopez of Villa's army, boarded the train. The armed men forced
the Americans off the train, had them remove their clothes,
and shot all of them." One American feigned death and escaped
‘“Clarence C. Clendenen, Blood on the Border: The United
States Army and the Mexican Irregulars (London; CollierMacmillan Ltd., 1969), pp. 186-187.
"Link, Wilson; Confusions and Crisis, p. 196.
"Hart, Revolutionarv Mexico, p. 321.
"Knight, The Mexican Revolution, pp. 344-355.
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to tell the story. Although the incident brought no direct
action from President Wilson, the American people now thought
of Villa as an enemy of the United States and a murderer of
Americans.

The American Army would not begin chasing Villa

because of the murders at Santa Ysabel, but very shortly the
army would receive its marching orders into Mexico because of
an even greater outrage.'*
In the

early months

of

1916,

rumors

of

an

impending

attack from across the Mexican border became common among the
United States soldiers on the American s i d e . B y
week of March,
Colonel

Herbert

the first

reports that Villa had moved north reached
J.

Slocum,

commander

of

the

13th

Cavalry

Regiment stationed at Camp Furlong in Columbus, New Mexico.'*'
Since rumors also placed Villa all over northern Chihuahua,
Slocum did not give much credence to the reports. Moreover,
President Wilson had given orders preventing American forces
from crossing the border to gather information,
Slocum with

little reliable

adversary.

On

the

5th

or

intelligence
the

6th

of

which left

on his potential
March,

the

War

'*Link, Confusions and Crisis, pp. 201-203.
'^Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho
Villa; A Study in Unconventional Diolomacv (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1961), pp. 236-238.
'"Frank E. Vandiver, Black Jack: The Life and Times of
John J. Pershing (College Station: Texas A&M University Press,
1977), pp. 603-604.
'^Col. Frank Tompkins, Chasing Villa: The Storv Behind the
Story of Pershing's Expedition into Mexico (Harrisburg: The
Military Service Publishing Company, 1934), p. 42. As a major
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Department sent Slocum a report of "reliable" information that
Villa would cross the border to surrender to the Americans,
and "unreliable" information that villa would raid towns on
the American side of the border.'*
Three miles south of Columbus, New Mexico, on the Mexican
border, two detachments of United States cavalry from Columbus
stood watch.*’ Villa

broke his

army of

about

five hundred

mounted men into small groups and moved through a gap between
the two detachments and into United States' territory. After
consolidating on the American side of the border. Villa's army
headed towards Columbus. A half mile before the town. Villa
again divided his forces. At about four-thirty in the morning,
before the sun began to lighten the sky, the Villistas began
their attack.

One column attacked

from the west

into the

middle of the town, while the other attacked from a southerly
route into Camp Furlong,

located in the southeast corner of

the town.^®
Militarily, the raid ended in failure for Villa. Although
few Americans except for the camp cooks were awake when the

stationed at Columbus during Villa's raid, Tompkins led the
pursuit across the international border immediately following
the raid.
*®Ibid., p. 46; Link, Confusions and Crisis, p. 205.
'’Herbert Molloy Mason Jr., The Great Pursuit: General
John J. Pershing's Punitive Expedition across the Rio Grands
to Destroy the Mexican Bandit Pancho Villa (New York: Random
House, 1970), p. 9.
Tompkins, Chasing Villa, pp. 48-49.
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raid

began,

the

Americans

quickly

organized

a

stiff

resistance. Most of the American officers lived in the town,
many with their families, and were cut off from their men. The
Americans

nevertheless

Mexicans broke

rallied

against

into small groups

machine guns. In ninety minutes,

the

in face

attackers.
of

The

the American

four Benet-Mercier machine

guns fired about 20,000 rounds, despite the tendency of the
weapons to jam.^'
Although this seems like an enormous waste of ammunition,
the machine guns greatly aided the Americans

by

laying a

suppressive fire that forced the Mexicans to seek cover and
robbed them of freedom of movement. The machine guns, although
complicated to load even in daylight and prone to jamming,
gave

the

Americans

a

large

advantage

over

the

attacking

Mexicans
Another reason the raid broke down was that the Mexicans
expected to find only a small garrison. Finding instead many
American soldiers,

the Mexicans broke into small,

isolated,

and confused groups in the darkness. Often their fire served
only to signal their position to the Americans.^ By 6:30,
when the Mexican bugler

sounded retreat,

some

sixty-seven

Mexicans lay dead in Columbus. Another five had been captured
^‘ibid. , pp. 52-53. The account of the machine guns comes
from the report of a Lieutenant Lucas who took charge of the
machine guns during the battle.
“ Eisenhower, Intervention!. pp. 222-223.
“ Ibid.
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and were executed by hanging.^ As the Mexicans headed back
towards the border,
Under

the

the Americans began a counter attack.

leadership

Americans

hounded

shortages

of

of

the

ammunition

Major
raiders

Frank

Tompkins,

until

forced them

lack
to

of

abandon

fifty-nine
water
the

and

chase

fifteen miles south of the border.“ During the retreat from
Columbus, the Mexicans lost another hundred killed, as well as
two of their own machine guns and most of the plunder taken
from the town.^**
When Major Tompkins reached the border fence, his troops
cut through, and the American force continued in hot pursuit
onto Mexican territory. After an initial skirmish with Villa's
rear guard. Major Tompkins sent word back to Colonel Slocum on
the situation and asked for instructions. Forty-five minutes
later the reply came for the major to use his own judgement.^
Tompkins continued the pursuit into Mexico. Eventually, on an
open plain, the Mexicans realized how few Americans followed
them and turned to fight.

The Americans pulled back to a

defensible position on a mound and waited for the Mexicans to
attack.

After forty-five minutes of waiting,

the Americans

headed back towards Columbus, passing on their way between
seventy-five

and

one hundred dead Mexicans

killed

^Tompkins, Chasing Villa, p. 53.
^Ibid., p. 56.
2‘lbid.

^Ibid.
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Mexican side of the border.^*
Psychologically, another, stronger border had also been
crossed. Although Wilson was quite content to send special
agents into Mexico and land the Marines at Veracruz, he had
forbidden the United States Army from crossing the border into
Mexico. To him, despite his almost constant meddling in the
Mexican Revolution since taking office, the United States held
a neutral stance in the s t r u g g l e . A s
elected good men,

long as those Latins

Wilson would respect

sovereign nation. Unfortunately,

their rights

as

a

from Wilson's perspective,

those Latins refused to cooperate, which forced him to become
ever more deeply involved in Mexico.“
The Mexicans,

for their part,

held a strong antipathy

towards the United States. Less than seventy years had passed
since the United States annexed half of Mexico following the
Mexican-American War, and the resentment remained.^* Under the
Monroe Doctrine, the United States assumed the responsibility
to protect European interests in Mexico.

For the Mexicans,

this simply meant that the Yankees ignored Mexican sovereignty
whenever

the

Mexicans

threatened

to

stop

the

export

of

2*ibid., p. 57.
^ a t z . The Secret W a r , p. 195.
’"Ibid., pp. 156-157.
’’The Gadsden Purchase of 1853 further increased the
Mexican fear of another land grab by the United States. Many
Mexicans felt, with good reason, that the United States would
use the current unrest in Mexico to annex more territory. Some
in Congress were interested in acquiring Baja California.
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Mexico's wealth. In 1910 Americans held more invested wealth
in Mexico
stirred

up

than the M e x i c a n s . T h e
all

the

old

occupation

anti-American

of

feelings

Veracruz

within

the

Mexicans. By railing against the Americans and threatening the
border.

Villa,

or any other revolutionary,

could become a

popular hero to the masses of M e x i c a n s . A n d after his defeat
at

Agua

Prieta,

Villa

definitely

needed

a

boost

to

his

popularity.
Fears on the American side that fighting in Mexico might
spill into the United States had brought the US Army to the
border in 1911. However, the revolutionary armies of Mexico
stopped short of actually crossing the border,

although at

times the United States government did allow favored factions
to use American railroads. Most of the duties for the United
States Army on the border involved attempting to stop the flow
of arms that poured south. Occasionally a few towns in Texas
lured bandits who would rob and flee, but never on the scale
of the Columbus raid.^ The Columbus raid was a calculated
attack

on

an

American

town.

Villa

himself

maintained

a

personal relationship with US Army Chief of Staff Hugh Scott,
who could never bring himself to believe that Villa took part

^^Katz, The Secret W a r , pp. 20-26.
”Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crisis, p. 205
"Ibid., pp. 195-196.
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in the raid.^^
After the raid, the United States government entered into
a diplomatic dance with the Mexican government of President
Venustiano C a r r a n z a . A l t h o u g h the Mexican and United States
governments had agreements permitting mutual hot pursuit of
outlaws

across

thirty

years

the border dating back

before,

the

to

Constitutionalist

Indian problems
government

of

Carranza could not stand the domestic political fallout if he
allowed

American

forces

to

enter

unopposed.

President

Carranza sent the American State Department a note through
Special Agent John R. Silliman on 10 March 1916, in which he
gave his interpretation of the events in Columbus. According
to him.

Villa

had

been

driven

to

the

reckless

attack

on

Columbus by the "persistent pursuit" of the Constitutionalist
General Gutierrez. After a summary of the cross-border Indian
raids a generation earlier, Carranza requested that if Villa
repeated the raid, the armies of both countries be allowed to
cross

the

border

in

hot

pursuit.^*

The

United

States

government, however, was more interested in destroying Villa
before he had a chance to raid another border town.
Also on 10 March, President Wilson held a cabinet meeting

^*Hugh Lenox Scott, Some Memories of a Soldier (New York:
The Century Company, 1928), pp. 516-517.
^Link, Wilson; Confusions and Crisis, pp. 2 07-2 08.
^^Ibid. , p. 210^*Tompkins, Chasing Villa, pp. 66-67
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at which he decided, with the full backing of the cabinet, to
send

a

"sufficient

disperse

or

body

capture

of mobile

the

band

or

troops...to
bands

locate

that

and

attacked

C o l u m b u s . O u t s i d e the meeting room, the reporters wanted a
statement.

President

Wilson,

planning the United States'

speaking

goals,

before

said that

thoroughly

"An adequate

force will be sent at once in pursuit of Villa with the single
object of capturing him and putting a stop to his forays.""®
After the cabinet meeting. Secretary of War Newton Diehl
Baker, who held a special grudge against Villa because the
raid took place on the day he was sworn in to his new office,
made his way to the office of General Hugh Scott. Although
Baker was an open pacifist,

he held the general

in great

respect and listened carefully to his advice. When Baker told
Scott that he wanted the army to catch Villa,

the general

pointed out the great problems of sending the army to catch
one man. Villa himself could always take a train to the south
of Mexico or even to South America. The true target for the
United States Army was Villa's army. The new mission statement
did not mention the capture of Villa, but instead focused on
the army that attacked Columbus as the target for the United

^’Newton D. Baker, "Enclosure I, Statement for Press," in
Arthur S. Link, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1978), 36:284.
40,lA Press Release," 10 March 1916, The Papers of Woodrow
Wilson. 36:287.
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States Army.'** Although the American soldiers at Columbus had
shown themselves equal to the task of fighting the Mexican
raiders,

mounting

an

expedition

into

Mexico,

while

simultaneously guarding the entire border, would soon expose
the shortcomings of the army.
On the same day Baker and Scott set the goals of the
expedition, the Secretary of War sent a telegram to General
Frederick Funston,

the Commanding General

of the

Southern

Department at Fort Sam Houston, Texas. In it. Baker outlined
the goals he and Scott had agreed on earlier in the day. The
message also named Brigadier General John Pershing as the head
of the expeditionary force,
General Pershing was born on 13 September 1860,
small town in Missouri.

in a

Entering West Point at age 22, he

graduated 13th out of seventy-seven in his class,

although

most of the students looked to him as their leader. After
graduation he became a cavalry officer and took part in the
final

Indian

campaigns

of

the

southwest.'*^

Later,

while

running the R.O.T.C. program at the University of Nebraska, he
acquired a reputation for severe, but fair, discipline.'*'* He
also led the 10th Cavalry of African-American soldiers

in

‘**Pershing Papers, Box 372.
'*^Newton D. Baker, "Memorandum for Adjutant General," 10
March 1916. Papers of Woodrow Wilson. 36:285.
^^andiver. Black Jack, pp. 47-104.
^Ibid., pp. 105-132.
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Montana for two years and took part in the Spanish-American
War campaign in Cuba. After the war, he participated in the
campaigns against the Moros in the southern Philippines. There
his coolness under fire, sound thought, and honor, eventually
earned him the respect of the M o r o s . P e r s h i n g knew how to
act in a delicate political atmosphere,

as well as how to

provide leadership to American forces on a difficult mission.
Pershing

married

the

daughter

of

Senator

Francis

E.

Warren of Wyoming, who was chairman of the Senate Military
Affairs Committee,

in 1905. Theodore Roosevelt attended the

ceremony. Later, when the president promoted him from captain
to

brigadier

general

over

the

heads

of

some

909

senior

officers, many of those senior officers charged favoritism.^
With the advent of problems on the Mexican border in
1913, Pershing received orders to return to the United States.
After settling his wife, three daughters,

and a son at the

Presidio of San Francisco, he went to Fort Bliss, at El Paso,
Texas, to take command of the 6th and 16th Infantry of the 8th
Brigade. In the summer of 1915, Pershing learned that all his
family except his six-year-old son had died in a fire at the
Presidio.

After

the

tragedy,

the

army

became

his

only

existence.
Pershing assumed command of the Punitive Expedition, U.S.
'‘^Ibid., pp. 315-316.
^Ibid., p. 390.
'‘■'Ibid., pp. 592-598.
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Army, on 11 March 1916. His orders gave him authority to take
only as large a force as needed to pursue and disperse Villa's
band and to protect his own lines of communication.'** Further
instructions prevented him from using the Mexican rail system
or entering cities. From the forces available— that is, those
within the continental United States— Pershing assembled two
columns for the expedition. The first column, to enter Mexico
from the east,

included the 13th Cavalry,

the 6th and 16th

Infantry Regiments, 1st Battalion, 4th Field artillery, with
an attached battery from the 6th Field Artillery, and the 1st
Aero Squadron, with 8 airplanes. The west column consisted of
the 7th Cavalry, the 10th Cavalry, and one battery of the 6th
Field Artillery.**® Pershing also brought

elements

from the

Signal Corps with radios to provide communications between his
columns.
Although the United States government insisted that the
expedition

would

operate

with

the

cooperation

of

the

Constitutionalist government and with the greatest respect for
Mexican

sovereignty.

President

Carranza

never

gave

his

approval. On 14 March, American intelligence reported that the
commander of the Mexican border town of Palomas would use
force against

an American

incursion.

Although the Mexican

commander offered no resistance when the expedition arrived.
***Tompkins, Chasing Villa, p. 71.
**®Ibid., pp. 73-74.
P e r s h i n g Papers, Box 372.
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his threat reminded the Americans that the expedition would
not be traveling through friendly country.
While in Mexico, the expedition tried to maintain good
relations with the Mexican people. However, incidents occurred
that sorely tested Pershing as a field commander in a highly
political

situation.

On

12

April,

an

American

cavalry

detachment of two troops, under the command of Major Tompkins,
entered the city of Parra1 expecting to find food and forage.
Instead they became the target of the anti-American wrath of
the city's residents.^^ When the local Carrancista commander
lost control of his forces and they joined the attack on the
Americans,

he tried to help the Americans out of the city.

Before extricating themselves, the Americans lost two men to
Mexican bullets. The Americans, however, in their first real
test of discipline under fire in Mexico, maintained cohesion
and were able to withdraw.
Unable to catch Villa,

the expedition evolved

into a

police action, with the goal of destroying of Villa's army. To
accomplish this, Pershing divided the area of operations into
five

districts.

Each

district

had

a

numbered

cavalry

responsible to track down and destroy Villista elements.^’
On the plains of the American west, or in the jungles of

^‘Tompkins, Chasing Villa, p. 74.
®^Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 266267.
53

Pershing Papers, Box 372.
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the Philippines, the army could conduct this type of operation
in relative obscurity. Mexico, however, remained a sovereign
nation, and Pershing could not always act as he saw best.^ By
June,

Carranza's

troops

began

to

assume

positions

that

threatened Pershing's lines of communications. With tensions
high between the Americans and the Mexican federal troops, a
clash became probable.

At Carrizal,

American

Mexican

soldiers

and

open

federal

fighting between

troops

became

the

hardest fight for the Americans in Mexico.
The incident began when an American cavalry force on a
reconnaissance mission, under the command of Captain Charles
T. Boyd, tried to force its way through the town.

The local

Carrancista commander refused permission to let them through.
Boyd hoped to teach the Mexicans a lesson, and perhaps gain a
little glory, but instead led his men into defeat.^ Against
Mexican machine guns and superior numbers, the Americans began
to fall back. A retreat turned into a rout when Boyd, followed
by other officers, was kille d. L uc k il y, the Carrancistas did
not leave the town to completely destroy the American force.
Patrols dispatched by Pershing picked up small bands of the
survivors wandering

the Mexican

plain

for

days

after

the

^Ibid.
^^Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 280281.
^Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crisis, p. 305.
’’ibid.
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battle.

The

Americans

suffered

a

total

of

forty-four

casualties to the Mexican's ninety-three.
After Carrizal, the American force did not venture beyond
150 miles south of the border. The chance of catching Villa
himself in that area was slim. Although discouraged at the
politically

imposed stalemate,

Pershing used this time to

train his many green recruits. The training in Mexico proved
to be invaluable to the army in less than a year. Pershing
later credited his success in Europe to training in a war of
movement received in Mexico.
While

Pershing

chased

Villa's

army

into

Chihuahua,

another group of Mexican raiders decided to attack the towns
of Glenn Springs, and Boquillas, Texas, near the Big Bend of
the Rio Grande.

On the night of 5-6 May,

1916,

about one

hundred Mexicans sacked the small town of Glenn Springs and
killed

a

few

of

the

American

soldiers

stationed

there.

Although hopelessly outnumbered, the soldiers managed to make
the Mexicans work for their plunder.

The Mexicans

finally

burned the roof of the building from which the soldiers fought
and shot the Americans as they fled from the flames.
Early on the morning of the 6th, the raiders left Glenn
Springs and headed down river about twelve miles to Boquillas,
Texas, where another group of raiders had been busy since ten

ssPershing

Papers, Box 372.

®’John J. Pershing, Mv Experiences in the World War (New
York: Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1931), 1:11.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61

that morning. From there the two groups headed back to Mexico
with

plunder

and

captives.

Overburdened

with

goods,

the

Mexicans commandeered a truck. When the poor road conditions
prevented the truck from keeping pace with the horse-borne
men, the captured Americans operating the truck were able to
overpower their Mexican guards and head back to the United
States.
After this raid, two companies of the 8th Cavalry from
Fort Bliss entered Mexico to search for the raiders. With 100
men, one forage truck, a pair of Ford sedans, and a Cadillac
touring

car,

the

new

detachment

mirrored

Pershing's

main

effort, only on a smaller scale. The expedition soon ran into
the same problems with transportation that the raiders had.
The cars and the truck fell miles behind the horse cavalry.
Except as a way to haul grain for the horses, the motorized
transport held little advantage on the rutted dirt roads of
Mexico. After two weeks and two hundred miles, the tired and
thirsty troopers returned to Texas after taking five prisoners
and leaving behind a few dead bandits.
News of the new raids placed an even larger burden on the
already overextended United States Army. General Scott sent
Secretary Baker a message stating that at least 150,000 more
troops were needed to protect the border.

In response,

the

president called out the National Guard of Texas, Arizona, and
New

Mexico.

The

small

numbers

of

National

®^ason. The Great Pursuit, pp. 167-181
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responding,

however,

failed to solve the problem.

Arizona

could call up only 907 Guardsmen, New Mexico 972, and Texas
3,381. Traditionally devoted to Combat Arms— branches whose
mission was fighting rather than support— the Guard units were
comprised mostly of infantry,

with two batteries of field

artillery and one cavalry squadron.^’ The combat arms carried
more prestige, so when groups or influential individuals had
formed companies

of organized militia,

they almost

always

chose a combat arms branch. Also, for the traditional uses for
militia— suppression of a strike or riot close to home— large
support functions would be of little use. On the border the
National Guard learned that if it was to become part of the
army,

it needed to provide more support units for extended

operations.
In response to the dismal showing of Guardsmen from the
border states,

on 18 June President Wilson called out the

entire National Guard of the United States for service on the
Mexican border. This brought the total of Guardsmen in federal
service on the border to over 110,000 by late summer.

These

augmented the over 35,000 Regular Army soldiers that Secretary
Baker ordered to the border in June. The effort on the Mexican

®‘John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National
Guard (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), p. 151.
“ ibid.
President Wilson called out the National Guard
through the state governors. The total Guardsmen mobilized was
123,605 enlisted and 8,589 officers. This was 97,350 men short
of the Guard's authorized war strength, but only 4,083 short
of its peacetime strength.
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border left the continental United States without any troops
to

spare.

For

practical

purposes,

all

troops

not

in

the

Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, or anywhere else overseas, were
on the border or in Mexico.
Although forbidden by law from crossing the Rio Grande,
the National Guardsmen benefitted from border duties. Along
with the experience of camp life and adjusting to full time
service, more important lessons were learned. Officers learned
supply could often take more time and effort than all other
duties. The Guardsmen also learned that membership in their
local militia company could sometimes mean more than a weekly
lost evening or call-up for a local problem."^^Even so. General
Scott thought the National Guard would still need six months
of training to be combat-ready.^
Meanwhile, the Regular Army was learning many of the same
lessons regarding supply and transport. However, they operated
deep in Mexico,

where communication problems and political

difficulties added to the problems.

The aero squadron— the

first American military use of airplanes— performed poorly and
well

below

expectations.

Vastly

under-funded

compared

to

European air forces, the American Army could bring only eight
Jennies for reconnaissance into Mexico. Mechanical problems
and reoccurring troubles with cracked propellers dropped the

63/

^Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 287-

288.
“Mahon, Historv of the Militia, p. 152.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

64

number of usable aircraft to two by 20 A p r i l . L a t e r the army
sent these back to Columbus. The poor showing of American air
power in the Mexican campaign helped destroy the notion that
the army needed only a few planes.
Other problems surfaced. Many cavalry horses died from
the trip to the border. Pushed into service without a proper
quarantine or acclimatization, the horses fell victim to the
Mexican

heat.

The

sudden

change

in

diet

increased

their

susceptibility to disease.“ The McClellen saddle, a sort of
miniature hammock the cavalry used, caused many of the men to
complain of back pains after long days of riding. The saddle
also made carrying a saber and rifle awkward. As a result,
many of the soldiers discarded their sabar, which they found
obsolete anyway.

However,

sabers and even horses,

as the

European armies were discovering, had passed from usefulness
in combat. The machine gun and rifle forced the soldier in
combat to seek cover, rather than present a target high on
horseback.

Denied

the use

of Mexican

continued to rely on animal

transport

railroads,

the

army

for moving men and

supplies across the plains of Chihuahua. However, every horse
or mule became another mouth to feed. Gasoline was cheaper

*®Pershing Papers, Box 372.
^Clyde E. Hawkins, "What Horse for the Cavalry," Journal
of the United States Cavalrv Association 28 (July, 1917), 100.
‘‘^Charles D. Rhodes, "Notes on Cavalry Equipment," Journal
of the United States Cavalrv Association 28 (July, 1917) , 8290.
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than oats.

Although the horse would be

important for army

logistics in Mexico, its replacement in that role had surfaced
in the motor vehicles brought to Mexico with the expedition.
The automobile made its debut with the United States Army
during the Punitive Expedition. Pershing brought six as staff
cars. American truck manufacturers also began sending trucks
for the army's use. The army quickly learned which domestic
truck manufacturers produced a reliable product. However, the
new Jeffrey Quads, Whites, Packards, and Locomobiles needed
experienced drivers, few of which existed within the army.**
Drivers had to be trained. Although the trucks were originally
intended for logistics, soldiers quickly found new uses for
them such as troop movements and reconnaissance. The limits of
wheeled vehicles became apparent as well.

The trucks also

showed

Most

the necessity

for

improved

roads.

roads

soon

became impassible from ruts. With few good roads in Mexico,
the army had to build many of its own roads, greatly delaying
the impact of the trucks.
Despite the constant need to adapt to new technology,
some soldiers found change difficult to accept. Although the
saber proved as useless in Mexico, at least one professional
soldier

still

expedition.

championed

Second

it.

Lieutenant

While

still

on

Patton published

**Vandiver, Black Jack, p. 612
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defending the saber in the cavalrv Journal.*^ To Patton, the
lack of use for the saber in Mexico reflected only the nature
of that particular campaign, and in no way foreshadowed any
new development. To Patton, the lack of news from the European
war on cavalry operations, which to him were synonymous with
the saber, reflected only the reporters' lack of knowledge in
military matters.

Deeply enamored with the French cult of

elan, Patton urged the continued reliance on the saber to give
the

cavalry

the

glory

it

needed

to

perform

its

mission.

Clearly Patton had not yet met the tank.
The

problems

on

the

border

caused

by

the

Mexican

Revolution gave the army the opportunity to try other new
ideas. An exercise conducted on the Texas side of the border
on 6 October 1916, began the United States Army's attempt to
find the proper role

for motor vehicles

in combat.^® With

fifty Regular Army and National Guard officers watching, the
army conducted a series of exercises to see if truck-borne
infantry could overcome a retreating enemy. Aside from basic
findings such as the need to mount a machine gun on every
vehicle in case of ambush, the exercise was part of the long
process of replacing the horse with machines.

Although the

ultimate finding of the exercise was the usefulness of trucks
^George S. Patton Jr., "A Defense of the Saber,” Journal
of the United States Cavalrv Association 27 (July 1916), 4850.
^^Brigadier General James Parker, "Cavalry and Auto
Trucks," Journal of the United States Cavalrv Association 27
(July 1916), 349-360.
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for supply of horse-mounted cavalry, in Europe the movement of
supplies became the last mission for the horse in modern w a r ,
as

tanks

and

trucks

slowly

proved more

efficient

on

the

battlefield. The United States Army had already discovered the
limits of the horse in Mexico.
The experiences of the American Expeditionary Force in
Mexico altered the army. General Pershing, as well as other
leaders, gained valuable experience of handling large bodies
of

men

in

a

delicate

political

environment.^*

Both

the

practical and mechanical problems of motor vehicles became
apparent, as did the inadequacy of America's air power.
Perhaps most important, the government saw the inadequacy
of the National Guard as then structured. The long debate over
the relationship between the Regular Army and the nation's
second line of defense set the parameters for potential change
and suggested remedies for potential problems, but it failed
to spur action. The hypothetical threats raised during the
preparedness debate could not bring the government or the army
to address the weaknesses

in the Regular Army or National

Guard. Problems on the Mexican border, however, presented a
very real problem. The Mexican border crisis forced the United
States to alter fundamentally the relationship between state
forces and the Regular Army.
By February 1917, Germany had pushed Mexico off the front

’*Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa, pp. 294295.
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pages of American newspapers. With Pershing largely successful
in his attempt to rid northern Mexico of Villista elements,
and with the growing threat of war against the Central Powers,
the president pulled the expedition out of M e x i c o . B y then
the remaining Villistas and the Mexican federal government
under Carranza had again taken arms against each other. The
internal Mexican fighting made an alliance between Mexico and
Germany unlikely and enabled the United States to mobilize
against

the

Central

Powers

without

fear

for

border.

72

Ibid, pp. 293-294.
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southern

IV.

As

Adoption of the National Defense Act of 1916

the

bulk

of

the

Regular Army

and

National

Guard

learned its lessons in the heat of the American Southwest and
in northern Mexico, Congress began to create a new law that
would better allow the army to respond to the changes in its
mission since

the

era of the

Founding

Fathers.

The

final

product, the National Defense Act of 1916, bore the imprint of
the

preparedness

debate,

the

experience

in

Mexico,

the

lobbying power of the National Guard Officers Association, and
the

ghost

of

Emory

Upton.

Once

the

Act

became

law,

the

original concept of the relationship between the Regular Army
and Organized Militia— supplanted by the National Guard— was
fundamentally changed.
At

the

start

of

the

twentieth

century,

partisans

of

reform grappled with the problem of how to create a military
force that would be competent in wartime yet not be dangerous
to liberty in peacetime. The United States Volunteers,

not

specified in the Constitution, had been the vehicle to expand
the

military

during

wartime

for

a

century.*

However,

the

‘Volunteer Act of 1861. Thirty-seventh Congress. Sess. I
Ch. 9.
69
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system had serious pitfalls. The Sand Creek Massacre, fought
by

the

"Bloody Third"

Colorado

Cavalry

of

US Volunteers,

illustrated the drawbacks of using 100 day recruits to wage
war. John J. Chivington, a political ally of the territorial
governor, led the Third Colorado. Recruited for the specific
purpose of fighting Indians during the Civil War, the Third
attacked Black Kettles's band of Cheyennes, which had already
surrendered. When the Coloradans were done, "some two hundred
Cheyenne

corpses,

about

two-thirds

women

and

littered the valley of Sand C r e e k . H u n g r y

children,

for glory,

the

short-term recruits behaved like men playing soldier, rather
than as true soldiers.
Following the Spanish-American War,

military planners

realized that the system needed change. However, with Theodore
Roosevelt and his Volunteer Rough Riders receiving popular
credit for the defeat of Spain, no one wanted to hear about
the

Regular

soldiers,

Army

that

units,

cleared

especially
the

way

the

for

units

his

of

famous

black

charge.

Americans retained their traditional disdain for Regulars and
continued to champion the amateur soldiers. When the Regulars
were also black,
concept
strength

of
of

the
the

they became invisible to the public.
war-time

Volunteer

republic

remained

as

the

real

entrenched

in

The

military
popular

imagination, if not in fact.
^Robert M. Utley,
The Indian Frontier of the American
West 1846-1890 (University of New Mexico Press, 1984), p. 8993.
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Americans in 1916,

no less than their predecessors in

1789, tended to distrust a large standing army and to place
great faith in the civilians who took up arms when war began.
The Minutemen of Lexington and Concord so captured the pubic
imagination that many forgot that General Washington had to
assemble, train, and maintain the Continental Army of regulars
in order to win independence from Britain.
Americans

convinced

themselves

that

a

After the war,

mythical

citizen-

soldiery won the war rather than accept that the republic owed
a

great

debt

to

the

professional

soldiers

for

securing

independence.^
Although the concept of United States Volunteers captured
the public's imagination, the decades following the Civil War
witnessed a resurgence of interest in organized militia. Many
believed that the great casualties in the Civil War reflected
the relative inexperience of the Volunteer units,

and more

particularly that of their officers. Men died needlessly until
officers learned the trade of war. Advocates of the militia
saw

the

solution

in

organized

companies

of

militia

that

drilled regularly in peacetime and which could then assist the
Regular Army in war.*

^Royster, A Revolutionary People at War. As part of his
basic thesis, Royster argues that revolutionary rhetoric of
the nation-in-arms failed to arouse the American people for
the prolonged war against Britain, forcing leaders to rely on
the Continental Army.
*John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and National Guard
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 108-114.
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Given the need for organized units and training,

the

resurgent organized militia— or as it was increasingly called.
National Guard— maintained in every state, began to wrest from
the Volunteers the official role as the nation's second line
of

defense.

The

Guard

already

had

units

in

existence.

Moreover, unlike partisans of the Volunteers, advocates of the
militia had a strong Constitutional argument. Tracing their
ancestry to the 1630s, the militia far antedated the United
States Army. The Founding Fathers considered the militia and
the army as separate institutions. Article I, section 10, of
the Constitution stated that

"no state shall,

without the

consent of Congress...keep troops...", but in the oft quoted
second amendment, the Constitution guaranteed the right of the
states
Article

to

keep

II,

"[a]

section

well
3

regulated

established

militia...".
the

president

However,
as

the

Commander-in Chief of the militia when in federal service.
Clearly, the framers intended that the militia would be called
into federal service when needed.
The Regular Army, however, had little but contempt for
the militia. Although not published until January 1904, copies
of Major General Emory Upton's book. The Militarv Policv of
the United States, had been passed around the War Department
for years before publication.^ Regular Army officers quoted
Upton's book as gospel. The book reflected Upton's infatuation
with the Prussian military. The Uptonites believed that state
^Ambrose, Upton and the Armv. pp. 151-154
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control of militia would always make it useless as a reserve
force.

To

Upton's

disciples,

the

answer

was

a

federally

controlled reserve force, independent of state meddling. The
organized militia, even if called 'National Guard,' was still
fundamentally a state force and therefore worthless to the
Regular Army.®
The Regulars had a good argument. Until the Militia Act
of

1903,

the

federal

army

and

militia

units

had

little

standardization. Each state, territory, and the District of
Columbia,

had

organization.

its
To

own

uniforms,

integrate

this

training
polyglot

programs,

of

militia

and
into

federal service was practically impossible. The Militia Act of
1903--called "the Dick Act" after the bill's sponsor, Charles
F. Dick— sought to correct this.^ The Dick Act was the first
exercise of power over the militia by Congress since 1792. The
Militia Act of 1792 required all males between 18 and 4 5 years
of age to arm themselves and attend an annual muster.® Most
people

ignored

the

law,

as

did

the

state

and

federal

governments.’ By the time of the War of 1812, the Jeffersonian
®Ibid., p. 154.
^Derthick, The National Guard in Politics, p. 26. The
bill's sponsor was General Charles F. Dick, Chairman of the
Senate Militia Committee, president of the National Guard
Association, and Commanding General of the Ohio National
Guard.
®Militia Act of 1792. Second Congress. Sess. I. Ch. 33.
sec. 1.
’Mahon, Historv of the Militia and National Guard, p p .
81-83.
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ideal of the general militia of all able-bodied male citizens
had

been

abandoned.After

the

Civil

War,

however,

local

groups, usually including many veterans, began to take militia
training seriously." Although still called militia in most
states, these constituted the real beginning of the National
Guard.

The Dick Act gave official recognition to the term

'National Guard' for the organized militia of the states.
the time,
although

most militia units
attendance

varied

drilled one

widely,

and

evening

some

units

At

a week,
seldom

drilled at all. The Dick Act authorized federal funds for at
least two mandatory drills per month.*’ Guard units had to
hold a minimum number of target practices every year.** The
1903 Act also required militia units to spend short periods in
the field annually.*’ Each state's militia had to follow the
Regular Army in organization, equipment, and discipline.** The
planners hoped the changes would mold the National Guard into

***Cress, Citizens in Arms, p. 176.
**Derthick, The National Guard in Politics, pp. 15-16.
‘^Militia Act of 1903. Fifty-seventh Congress. Sess. II.
Ch. 196. sec 1.
*’lbid., sec. 18.
This part of the act stipulated that
each unit would hold not less than 24 drills per year. Drill
normally consisted of a weekly two-hour period on a weekday
evening.
*^*Ibid.
*’lbid., The annual training period had to
least five days of field training.
**Ibid., sec. 3.
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an effective reserve force that the federal army could use.
The Militia Act of 1903, however, contained many clauses
that severely weakened it. state governors retained the right
to

authorize

service.

or

Even

to

deny

with

the

their

state's

governor's

unit

for

consent,

federal

individual

Guardsmen needed to volunteer for federal service; they could
not

be drafted

against

their will.

In

addition,

federal

service could not extend beyond nine months.** Finally,

no

federal

to

remove

agency,
militia

including
officers,

the
no

army,

had

the

authority

matter

how

incompetent

they

were.*’ Amendments to the Militia Act of 1903 in 1908 gave the
president the right to prescribe the length of time militia
units

could spend

Guardsmen

could

in federal
not

be

service,

forced

to

although
serve

past

individual
existing

enlistments or commissions.“
The changes of 1908 further provided that the National
Guard could be ordered for service "either within or without
‘^Gene Gurney, A Pictorial History of the United States
Armv (New York: Crown Publishers Inc., 1966), p. 310. However,
section 7 of the 1903 act seems to dispute this. But the
Militia Act of 1908, Sixtieth Congress, session II. chapter
204, sec 43, supports the notion of federal control only at
the governor's consent.
**Militia Act of 1903, sec. 5.
*’lbid., sec. 8. The law stated that only militia officers
could serve on courts-martials for officers and men of the
National Guard for offenses while in federal service.
^“Militia Act of 1908. Sixtieth Congress. Sess. I. Ch.
204. sec. 5. This amendment gave the president the power to
keep militiamen in federal service as long as the president
required rather than the nine month limit of the Act of 1903.
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the Territory of the United States.
Attorney
outside

General
of

ruled

United

that

However in 1912, the

sending

States

National

territory

Guard

units

violated

the

Constitution.^^ This led to incidents such as one in which the
Virginia National Guard,

in federal service on the Mexican

border in 1916, would ride their mounts up to the Mexican bank
of the Rio Grande by the town of Matamoros,

but not would

leave the river.“
In 1910, the United States Army General Staff finally
developed a plan to

integrate

the

state militia

federal army during national emergences.

into the

At that time,

the

Regular Army was scattered throughout the continental United
States in battalions occupying some forty-nine posts left from
the days of the Indian Wars.^ Most of the posts held little
or no military value and remained active for the economic
benefit

of

the

local

community.

In

addition,

the

War

^‘Militia Act of 1908, sec 5.
^^Official Opinions of the Attorneys General of the United
States Advising the President and Heads of Departments in
Relation to Their Official Duties. George Kearney, ed.
(Washington: GPO, 1913), 29:322-329. In a reply to an inquiry
from the Secretary of War, Attorney General George W.
Wickersham ruled that the militia, regardless of its name,
could only be used for the constitutionally sanctioned
purposes: suppression of insurrection, repelling of invasion,
or execution of laws. The militia could only leave United
States territory in pursuit of an invading army.
^John Listman, "Old Dominion's Wartime Maneuvers Along
the Rio Grande," The National Guard Magazine 46 (May 1992),
45.
^William Addleman Ganoe, The Historv of the United States
Armv (Ashton Maryland; Eric Lunberg, 1964), p. 68.
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Department posted a large minority of the Regular Army

in

America's newly acquired overseas possessions: The Canal Zone,
Puerto Rico, Hawai'i, Guam, Alaska, and the Philippines. For
internal police duties,

such as Indian uprisings and labor

unrest, this arrangement worked. But as Wounded Knee receded
into the past, and the Spanish-American War brought America
into the first ranks of world power, this arrangement became
a liability.
For an army to be effective against another army, it must
be concentrated. Toward that end, the General Staff developed
a plan for the Regular Army to form three divisions.“ The
General

Staff

hoped

that

the

changes

would

allow

larger

formations to train together. This plan failed due to lack of
funds to implement it. In 1912, the army developed a plan for
the Regular Army to form four permanent divisions and the
National Guard to form twelve divisions.“ However this was
only an administrative change; no troops were moved and the
army remained scattered in small posts.
In 1911, before the first plan was fully implemented,
fear of trouble on the Mexican border caused by the revolution
forced the War Department to develop an alternative plan.
General Wood hastily formed a "maneuver division" of Regular
Army

units

and

sent

it

to

the

border. This

mobilization

“ ibid., p. 437.
^*^ahon, Historv of the Militia and National Guard, p .
145.
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demonstrated the weakness of the

army. None of

the units

arrived at the border fully armed or at full strength.

The

army stripped units not part of the maneuver division to fill
those that went. Assembly took longer than planned, and the
War Department soon disbanded the division.^ In February of
1913, a mobilization on the Texas border by the Regular Army's
Second

Division

met

with more

success

due

to

reforms

in

planning made after the fiasco in 1911.^®
In the amendment to the Dick Act in 1914, the National
Guard Officers Association received designation for the Guard
as the nation's second line of defense. Guardsmen still had to
volunteer

for

federal

service

as

individuals,

but

the

president had to accept any unit with over three-quarters of
its

members

individuals

volunteering.
due

to

the

Guardsmen

had

constitutional

to

volunteer

barriers

of

as

using

militia beyond the borders of the United States. In wartime,
the president had to accept all National Guard units that
volunteered before he could accept any US Volunteers.^’
By 1915, Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison developed
a plan for a reserve force to replace the National Guard as
the country's main augmentation of the Regular Army. Convinced
that state control of Guard units would always hamper their

^Weigley, Historv of United States Armv. pp. 334-335.
2*lbid.
^Volunteer Act of 1914. Sixty-third Congress.
Ch, 71. sec. 3.
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usefulness. Garrison planned a federal military reserve that
he called, in a political move to link it with patriotism and
the Founding Fathers, a Continental Army. This force was to
have between 400,000 and 500,000 men.^® Basically, Garrison's
plan copied George Washington's plan for a federal militia.
President Wilson supported this plan at first. During a
speech on 4 November 1915, the President called for a moderate
increase of the Regular Army, a strengthened National Guard,
and a 400,000 man Continental Army.^‘ Completely under federal
control, members of the Continental Army were to be civilian
volunteers who trained in summer camps.
bitter

resistance

Association,

which

from

the

correctly

The plan met with

National
feared

it

Guard
as

an

Officers
attempt

to

shuffle the Guard into obscurity. Many Southern Congressmen
feared that blacks would join in large numbers and so opposed
the

idea.

committee,

When
he

Garrison

admitted

testified

that

Continental Army would most

many

of

before
the

men

the
for

House
the

likely come from the National

Guard, but as the Guard and Regular Army could not recruit to
strength, the government would probably need to draft soldiers
for the new reserve. This killed the plan for the immediate
f u t u r e . A l t h o u g h not included in the 1916 Act, the concept
^“Clifford, Citizens in Arms, p. 118.
’‘Ibid., p. 123.
’^Link, Wilson: Confusions and Crises, p. 51
’’Ibid., p. 125-127.
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of the Continental Army was later realized as the Array Reserve
after World War II.
Another idea from the period, which did become part of
the Act, was the Officer Training Camps movement.

From the

summer of 1913, the army had conducted a series of Student
Military Training Camps. Students from the nation's colleges
and universities spent four or more weeks, depending on the
year,
his

learning basic military skills. Each student paid for

uniform

and

meals.

After

completing

the

course,

his

training with the army finished, each "veteran" was expected
to spread the gospel of military preparedness.^
Related to the summer camps was military instruction at
land-grant colleges. The Morrill Act of 1863 required that all
the land-grant colleges teach courses in military tactics.”
Some, such as Norwich University in Vermont and the Virginia
Military Institute, conducted highly credible programs. At the
majority of schools, however, the training was considered a
boring joke by the students and the equivalent of exile by the
officer-instructors.

Moreover,

the War

Department

kept

no

record of students with military training once these students
had graduated from college,” Major General Leonard Wood, the
army Chief of Staff, who earned his commission through the
”lbid.
”Morrill Act. Thirty-seventh Congress. Sess. II. Ch. 130,
sec. 4.
”Gene M. Lyons, and John W. Masland, "The Origins of the
ROTC," Militarv Affairs 23 (Spring 1959), 1-12.
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Medical

Corps

cooperation

and

not

between

West

the

Point#

War

and

began

to

Interior

agitate

for

Departments

for

standardization of the instruction at land-grant colleges. He
also hoped to give provisional commissions, what today would
be called Reserve Commissions, to the honor graduates, who,
after a year of active training in the Regular Army, would
form an officers reserve.
In 1916, as a result of the shortcomings exposed by the
response to Villa's raids and the threat of war in Europe,
Congress passed the National Defense Act. This was the last
restructuring of the military before entry into the Great War.
Through

it,

the

government

tried

to

correct

shortcomings of the Militia Act of 1903.
1903,

the

status

of

the National

Guard

many

of

the

Under the Act of
remained unclear.

Although it was the first reserve of the army,

legally it

remained militia and was therefore limited to the territorial
United States. The experience of the Guardsmen reacting to the
raids by Mexican revolutionaries highlighted this problem. The
National

Defense

Act

of

1916

fundamentally

relationship of the organized militia,

altered

the

the National Guard,

when called into federal service. The new law defined the Army
of the United States as consisting of the Regular Army, the
Volunteer Army,

the Officers'

Reserve Corps,

the

Enlisted

Reserve Corps, and the National Guard when in federal Service.
In

truth,

actually

only

the

existed.

Regular

The

Army

combat

and

arms

of

the
the

National
Regular

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Guard
Army

82

consisted
cavalry,

of

64

21

regiments

regiments

of

of

infantry,

field

26

regiments

artillery,

and

a

of

coast

artillery corps. The total authorized enlisted force for the
Regular Army consisted of a peacetime strength of not more
than 175,000 men, not counting the Philippine Scouts, Medical
Department,

Quartermaster,

signal

corps,

and

unassigned

r e c r u i t s . T h e president could augment the Regular Army with
the organized state militia for the duration of the national
emergency as

in the changes of

1908.^* Also,

the

1916 act

brought the Puerto Rico Regiment of Infantry of the United
States Army closer to the Regular Army.
grades,

The organization,

and numbers of men and officers had to conform to

Regular Army standards.^’
Under the 1916 Act, the training camps of General Wood
received official support from Congress. The law specifically
gave the Secretary of War the authorization to hold the camps.
The

federal

government

assumed

the

cost

of

uniforms,

transportation, subsistence, and equipment for the trainees.'*®
During the Great War, these camps provided the majority of the
line

officers

for

the

greatly

expanded

army.

Candidates

^^National Defense Act of 1916, sec. 2.
’*Ibid. , sec 3. This was done by requiring all officers
and men of the National Guard to take a new oath swearing to
defend the United States as well as their home state. Upon
federalization,
all Guardsmen were discharged from the
National Guard and became Volunteers in the federal army.
^’ibid., sec. 21.
^Ibid., sec. 24.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

83

underwent an intensive ninety days of training to prepare them
as officers in a specific branch. These camps were the direct
forbear of the modern Officer Candidate School."*
The new law also gave the president authorization to
continue the Reserve Officers Training Corps— R.O.T.C— at all
land-grant colleges."^ Perhaps more important,

the Act gave

the president the authority to expand the R.O.T.C. program to
non-Land-Grant schools."* Reflecting another idea of General
Wood,

the

Act

instituted

the

practice

of

provisional

commissions for new officers who were not graduates of the
United States Military Academy. Under the Act, honor graduates
from R.O.T.C.

programs could serve on active duty for two

years with a provisional commission.

If a holder of such a

commission proved competent after two years, he could receive
a permanent commission and remain on active duty.""
Section 57 of the Act reasserted the right of the federal
government to conscript into the military. Wilson claimed that
when the Republic declared war, the citizens had in effect all
volunteered for military service."* The new law put this idea
"‘Ernest R. Dupuy and Trever N. Dupuy, Militarv Heritage
of America (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1956),
p. 358.
"^Ibid. , sec. 40-52. Section 52 gave the authority for
R.O.T.C. graduates to spend six months, not the full year
envisioned by General Woods, on active duty for training.
"*Ibid., secs. 40-42.
""ibid., sec. 23.
"^Clifford, The citizen Soldiers, p. 49.
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into legal form. "All able bodied male citizens of the United
States” and those intending to become citizens, between the
ages of 18 and 45, were declared to comprise the militia of
the United

States.

Men not

in the Regular Army,

or their

state's organized militia (National Guard) or naval militia,
formed the so-called unorganized militia.^ This meant, that
as residents of a democracy whose elected officials declared
either

a war

or

other

emergency,

they

were

eligible

for

military service. By electing the men who declared war, the
population already volunteered for active military service.
Another section standardized the number of Guardsmen in
each state. Within one year of passage of the act, each state
was

to

have

200

enlisted

men

for

each

senator

and

representative that the state sent to Congress. The president
received the authority to decide the number of Guardsmen each
territory and the District of Columbia could have. After the
first year, the plan called for the number of Guardsmen to
increase

by

fifty

percent

each

year

until

the

number

of

enlisted Guardsmen reached at least 800 per Congressman in
each s t a t e . A s the Guard units were already under strength,
the possibility of recruiting to higher
likely.

However,

strengths was not

with the United States formally at peace.

Congress hoped to provide a reserve force without resorting to
the conscription

implicit

in the plan

for the Continental

'^National Defense Act of 1916, sec. 57.
^^Ibid. , sec. 62.
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Army.
The new law also integrated the National Guard into the
War Department. The army had created a National Militia Board
to advise the army on militia matters in 1908.^* The new law
superseded this, moving militia affairs up to bureau level.
The Chief of this new Militia Bureau was also ex-officio a
member of the General Staff C o r p s . R e c o g n i z i n g the need for
closer relations between the Regular Army and the National
Guard,

the new law provided for 822 extra officers and 100

extra sergeants from the combat arms of the Regular Army to
serve one-year tours with the National Guard as instructors.*®
In a move that allowed the War Department better to integrate
the National Guard into war plans, the president received the
authority to decide which types of Guard units states were to
maintain.

Prior to this.

National Guard companies

adopted

whatever branch they fancied. After the Act of 1916, the army
could decide whether a Guard unit would be cavalry, artillery,
supply, or whatever the army needed.
The Officers'

Reserve Corps

and the

Enlisted Reserve

Corps existed only on paper. Only sixteen enlisted men joined

““ibid., sec. 81. This section states that the National
Militia Board was created by the Act of 27 May, 1908, amending
section 20 of the Act of 21 January 1903.
^’Ibid.
*®Ibid. , secs. 25, 36. Section 25 covers the
officers, and section 36 covers the extra sergeants.
*'lbid., sec. 197.
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the Enlisted Reserve C o r p s . T h e s e reserves differed greatly
from the Army Reserve of today. Instead of reserve units to
augment the army during mobilization,

the Enlisted Reserve

Corps was more akin to the modern Individual Ready Reserve— a
list of trained veterans who could be called back into the
Regular Army in times of crisis. The proposed Enlisted Reserve
Corps

was

not

a

corps

individual

soldiers

liability

for

at

all.

released

recall

Instead,

early

into

the

from

it

consisted

active

Regular

duty

Army

of

with

during

mobilization.^^ Unlike the modern Army Reserve, the members of
the Enlisted reserve Corps did not form any units and did not
train.
The Officers Reserve Corps filled General Wood's desire
for a plan to retain the services of college graduates with
officer training. Graduates of the summer training camps and
R.O.T.C. would then enter into the Officers Reserve Corps.
Under the Act, during wartime the reserve officers would serve
in the Regular Army, and work in support roles such as the
Quarter Master, staff, and recruit rendezvous and depots. In
addition, reserve officers were supposed to provide officers
for the Volunteer units, the old standby.^ The Volunteer Army
would

consist

of

large

units

of

either

volunteers

or

conscripts enlisted in time of war. The Continental Army idea
^^Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers, p. 10.
^^National Defense Act of 1916, sec. 55.
^Ibid, sec. 37.
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disappeared.
The

response

of

the

Regular

Army

reflected

its

experiences in Mexico and on the border. The Cavalry Journal
ran

an

editorial

course,

the

praising the

provisions

final

providing

compromise

for

an

b i ll Of

increase

in

the

cavalry branch brought the highest praise, which it directly
linked to the

"activities of one Pancho Villa."®* It also

approved of the incorporation of a machine gun troop into each
regiment of cavalry. Again this showed the influence of the
experiences of the expeditionary force in Mexico. The Journal
agreed with the provision to spread the increases in manpower
over a five year period, because it thought that the quality
of the army would suffer a from a sudden large increase. In
reality,

of course,

an increase larger and more rapid than

anything dreamed of was less than a year away.
however,
after

the Journal

the

first

feared that the

year.

The Journal

At the time,

increases would stop

believed that

Congress

planned only to increase the army for the immediate threat on
the

Mexican

border,

rather

than

as

a

long-term

plan

for

increasing the strength of the army.
Democracies,

for better or worse,

tend to move slowly

unless an actual emergency arises. During the national debate

®®Editor's Table, "The Army Bill," The Journal of the
United States Cavalrv Association 27 (July 1916), 151-154,
®*Ibid. , p. 151.
®^National Defense Act of 1916, sec. 24.
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over preparedness. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan
said that "the president knows that if this country needed a
million men, and needed them in a day, the call would go out
at sunrise and the sun would go down on a million men in
arms."“ Unfortunately,

in modern warfare, a million men put

under arms in a day would be at best an armed rabble, and at
worst cannon fodder to be slaughtered by professional armies.
Although unknown to both Congress and the army at the time,
the American declaration of war on Germany and Austria-Hungary
was less than a year away and would occur before many of the
changes took place.

The National Defense Act of 1916 did,

however, lay the basis for the United States to mobilize and
field over three million men during the year and a half the
United States was at war with the Central Powers.

58i

Merle Eugen Curti, Brvan and World Peace (Northhampton
Mass.: Smith College Studies in History, Vol.16, no. 3-4,
1931), p. 233.
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V. Conclusion

The National Defense Act of 1916, a compromise of various
needs

and

interests,

establishment.

What

fundamentally
the

Civil

War

altered
was

centralization of governmental power,
military power. State
continue,

but

the

influence

balance

had

federal government's favor.

to

the

military

the

increased

the 1916 Act was to

in military affairs would
shifted

decisively

in

the

The remainder of the twentieth

century would witness a continuation of the trend solidified
in 1916.
America's military involvement in the Mexican Revolution,
the preparedness debate, and the war in Europe, all served to
convince Americans to abandon the archaic model of national
defense
Founding

inherited

from

the

Fathers

reached

a

revolutionary
compromise

generation.

intended

to

The

ensure

defense of the nation without resorting to militarism.
result

fully

satisfied

neither

sovereignty nor advocates
However

the

system

the

of a more

outlasted

its

proponents

of

The

state

centralized republic.
framers.

In

the

pre

industrialized era, no potential adversary had the ability to
cross the ocean and attack without lengthy preparation that
also would have given the United

States

adequate

89
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time to

90

prepare.
Great Britain,

America's traditional

enemy throughout

much of the period before the twentieth century, provided the
only

exception.

The

War

of

1812

amply

demonstrated

the

weaknesses of America's defense system, yet the results also
showed the strengths of the decentralization of the United
States. The capture and destruction of the capital by Britain
did not mean victory for Britain. In addition, the army and
militia occasionally proved adequate for defense. Moreover,
the refusal of the militia to enter Canada reinforced the idea
that a citizens' militia prevented adventurism and ensured
that the military could be used only for defense. Despite the
limitations in the system, it served the government adequately
throughout the nineteenth century.
By 1914, however, the nation had changed considerably.
America's

flirtation with

imperialism

at

the

turn

of

the

century left the army with additional missions far removed
from the continental United States. With Europe at war and
direct United States involvement looming as a possibility, the
whole military establishment found itself overtaxed responding
to a small raid on the country's southern border. Although the
changes of 1903 and 1916 did not adequately prepare the army
for world war, they did overcome the constitutional limits of
a state-based second line of defense.' In the decade and a
'when the United States entered the Great War, the
Regular Army provided the 1st through 25th Divisions, the
National Guard provided 26 through 50, and the remaining
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half between the end of the Spanish-American War,
National Defense Act of 1916,

and the

the militia of the colonial

period evolved into a very different creation.
The modern National Guard replaced both the old militia
and the Volunteers.

With the dual

oath

or

enlistment

for

Guardsmen, the Guard became able to accompany the Regular Army
in any theater in the world. Although states continued to have
an

influence

in

their

Guard

units,

that

influence

waned

throughout the century. The defeat in federal courts of an
attempt

in

1987-88

Massachusetts,

and

by

other

the
states

governors
to

prevent

of

Minnesota,

their

states'

National Guard units from attending annual training exercises
in Honduras

underscored

the

point.^

state governments

had

become little more than cheerleaders for their National Guard
units in federal service. Governors held command over their
state National Guard only when the unit was not in federal
service. During the Great War this led to a dilemma: with the
states' only organized militia— the National Guard— liable for
service outside the United States, states were left in wartime
without a force for traditional militia functions. To prevent
a recurrence of the situation. Congress amended the National
Defense Act of 1916 during 1940, when the National Guard was
divisions were designated as "National Army." Although the
president could accept three Divisions of US Volunteers,
President Wilson did not exercise this right.
^Patrick Todd Mullins "The Militia Clause, the National
Guard, and Federalism: A Constitutional Tug of War," Georae
Washington Law Review 57 (December 1988), 328-329.
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federalized for a year of training. Under the amendment, the
states

received

specific

permission

to

form

an

organized

militia separate from the National Guard and not subject to
federal service. This new State Guard would fill the state
role of the National Guard while the National Guard was in
federal service.^ Most states created a State Guard during the
Second

World

War,

while

increasingly

relying

on

the

new

institution of the state police during peacetime. Traditional
militia functions of suppressing riots and maintaining order
became civil rather than military function.**
The watershed came

in the years between the Spanish-

American War and America's entry into the Great War. Those
years saw the abandonment of the militia system as inherited
from the Revolutionary generation and the creation of a new
system

of

defense.

The

National

Defense

established, with only minor modification,
between

the

regular

and

reserve

Act

of

1916

the relationship

components

of

the

United

States Army for the rest of the twentieth century.

^United States Senate Committee on Military Affairs, The
Home Guard. (Washington: GPO, 1944). This report deals with
the amendment to section 16 of the National Defense Act of
1916, which allowed states to create a non-National Guard
organized militia. Usually referred to as "State Guards,"
units were activated in most states for state duties during
the Second World War, and revised as a paper force during the
Korean War.
^Little work has been done on the State Guards. The most
in- depth study is the Historical Evaluation & Research
Organization's US Home Defense Forces Studv. prepared under
contract for the Assistant Secretary of Defense in 1981.
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